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ABSTRACT 
 
KNOW HOW, KNOW WHOM, KNOW WHERE: A GLOBAL ANALYSIS OF 
INVESTOR EXPERIENCE AND STARTUP PERFORMANCE 
Elisa Álvarez-Garrido 
Mauro Guillén 
 
 
 
This dissertation analyzes where and when experienced investors add value to 
startups. Building on the resource-dependence theory and the relational view of the firm, 
I argue that the positive effect of investor experience on startup performance is stronger 
when the startup faces a more uncertain environment. The first essay predicts a greater 
effect of investor experience early in the life cycle of the startup and when financial 
markets are less developed; when the expropriation hazard is high, investors have fewer 
incentives to make a contribution. The second essay examines the effect of investor 
experience on different innovative outcomes, and how these effects vary with the hazard 
of expropriation. The final essay studies whether these effects derive from the social 
status or the knowledge of investors. I collected a sample of 688 biotechnology startups, 
founded between 1990 and 2004, from 30 different countries, and followed them until 
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they went public, were acquired, or until 2005. I gathered the patents and publications, 
the investment history, and for each investor, the experience and network position in the 
global syndication network. Empirical analyses address the endogeneity problem derived 
from the matching of investors and startups using selection models and firm fixed effects. 
The main finding is that the positive effect of investor experience on firm performance 
and innovative outcomes is moderated by the institutional environment. The effect of 
investor experience on the likelihood of an IPO or acquisition is accentuated when 
financial markets are less developed; however, when faced with a hazard of 
expropriation, the effect is attenuated. Interestingly, experienced investors enhance 
innovative outcomes even more when the hazard of expropriation is high; this suggests 
that the experience of investors does not have the same value for financial or innovative 
performance in regulatory unstable environments. Finally, the effect of investor 
experience is driven both by the social status and the knowledge resources of investors. 
Moreover, both effects vary across institutional environment, but in different ways. 
Therefore, it is necessary to consider the institutional environment to analyze which 
investors add value to a startup, and the processes by which they do so.  
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1. The Resource Provision Role of Investors 
Introduction 
 Decades of research have examined the performance consequences of the 
governance and ownership of the organizations, starting with the seminal work of Berle 
and Means (1932) and continued by the work of agency theorists. More recently scholars 
from different traditions have studied investors in their role of resource providers. 
Resource-dependence theorists investigate the role of the board of directors in managing 
environmental uncertainty and providing external resources (Daily & Dalton, 1994a, 
1994b). Research on entrepreneurship has analyzed the performance consequences of 
having different types of investors, and some of the mechanisms by which this may 
happen (Gompers & Lerner, 2004; Gorman & Sahlman, 1989; Sapienza, 1992). Besides, 
the international business literature has studied how the investor mix changes across 
countries, and their impact on performance (Berglof, 1988; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
& Shleifer, 1999). 
 Because investors provide resources to the organizations, it is important to 
understand which investors have the more valuable resources and under what 
circumstances investors may have a greater impact. This question is economically 
important, especially for entrepreneurial firms, since they have to accept a lower 
valuation of their business to attract investors with higher reputation, with the hope that 
they will attain higher performance (Hsu, 2004). Past research has focused on answering 
the first part of the question, finding for instance that investors with prominent affiliate 
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networks have a greater effect on performance (Hochberg, Ljungqvist, & Lu, 2007; 
Stuart, Hoang, & Hybels, 1999). Yet, there is still much to be learned about under what 
conditions investors may have a greater impact on the performance of entrepreneurial 
firms. 
 This dissertation seeks to fill this gap by analyzing where the effect of investors’ 
experience and networks impact the performance of entrepreneurial firms more, across 
different institutional environments. In particular, I seek to understand (1) how the value 
added by investors varies with the financial and regulatory environment; (2) how 
investors contribute differently to different outcomes, such as financial performance and 
innovative outcomes; (3) and the relevance of networks and knowledge of this effect 
across different environments.  
Literature Review 
The Impact of Investor Mix on Performance 
 The link between investor mix and performance is one of the most important 
topics in strategy research. It is well documented that investor mix varies widely across 
firms, industries and countries (Berglof, 1988; La Porta et al., 1999). A subset of studies 
has analyzed the impact of investors on performance, among which agency theory studies 
are salient (e.g. Jensen & Ruback, 1983). This dissertation contributes to the strategy 
literature by studying the impact of investor mix characteristics on the performance of 
entrepreneurial ventures.  
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 Investors such as venture capital firms make their resources and abilities available 
to their portfolio ventures, for instance by providing access to their network of contacts 
(Hsu, 2006; Lindsey, 2002). As a venture capitalist explains, “we provide our portfolio 
companies with access to our contacts in other countries. This is very useful, for example, 
to help them internationalize. (…) [The portfolio firms] can use our contacts and offices 
for the first contacts with the seller. They have support there: people who know the 
country, the legal system… It is really useful for them.”1
 Consistent with the relational view of the firm (Dyer & Singh, 1998), the 
resources and abilities that venture capital firms bring to the partnership relationship have 
the potential to generate relational rents to the extent that they are complementary with 
the venture’s resources. To effectively generate relational rents, firms within the alliance 
need to develop an organizational complementarity such that the complementary 
resources effectively generate rents (Dyer & Singh, 1998). De Clercq and Sapienza 
(2001) theorize that it is through knowledge sharing routines and relation specific 
investments that venture capital firms and entrepreneurs generate relational rents. 
Anecdotal evidence also suggests that successful venture capital firms learn how to 
exploit this complementarity: “the type of consulting offered really depends upon the 
skill sets that the individual VC brings to the table with respect to that specific deal”; “we 
find ourselves spending a lot of time coaching in the areas they [the entrepreneurs] are 
not strong in” (eBrandedBooks.com, 2000:153 & 211, respectively).  
 
                                                 
1 Interview with the Director of the Madrid’s office of a U.S. venture capital firm, Dec-20-2005, Madrid, 
Spain. 
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The mechanism by which investors’ resources impact the venture’s performance 
is also consistent with the resource-dependence theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). This 
posits that when critical resources are controlled by a few organizations, firms that secure 
the provision of such resources will be more effective and legitimate. To the extent that 
there are critical resources in the hands of the best venture capital firms, ventures that 
partner with them will attain a competitive advantage. This is precisely the rationale 
behind the search for reputed and experienced investors: “the VCs provide capital and the 
really good ones provide great strategic insight and a roll up their sleeves of attitude,” as 
described by a venture capitalist (eBrandedBooks.com, 2000:232). 
In sum, the relational view of the firm (Dyer & Singh, 1998) and the resource-
dependence theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) offer mutually consistent explanations as 
to why investors’ resources impact the performance of new ventures. Hence, I propose:  
Proposition 1.1: Investors’ complementary resources and capabilities are a 
source of relational rents. Hence, ventures that partner with such investors enjoy 
a competitive advantage.  
The Heterogeneity of Venture Capital Firms 
 The link between investor mix and venture’s performance is an important topic in 
the entrepreneurship literature. A subset of studies has analyzed the relevance of having a 
venture capital firm in the syndicate for a venture’s performance, finding that venture 
capital firms facilitate the formation of strategic alliances (Hsu, 2006; Lindsey, 2002), 
and that they endorse ventures with their reputation (Hursti & Maula, 2007; Megginson 
& Weiss, 1991; Stuart et al., 1999). 
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 However, venture capital firms are not homogenous. On the contrary, they show 
persistent differences in returns (Kaplan & Schoar, 2005). A growing stream of literature 
has studied the consequences for performance of some of these differences. Stuart et al 
(1999) analyzed how the prominence of the different partners influenced the survival of 
the firms, finding that ventures with prominent investment bankers were more likely to 
go public. This effect of the reputation of venture capital firms is consistent with Hsu’s 
(2006) findings that reputed venture capital firms facilitate the formation of 
commercialization alliances more so than their less reputed counterparts. In a study of 
U.S. venture capital investments, Hochberg et al (2007) found that venture capital firms 
with a more central position in the syndication network increased the chances of survival 
of their startup, even after controlling for the experience of the venture capital firm. 
 Besides the network position and connections of the investors, knowledge 
resources are also invaluable. As a venture capitalist explains, “we want to be there for 
the hiring process, because we’ve interviewed thousands of people, know good interview 
techniques, and know how to get the right people” (eBrandedBooks.com, 2000:189). 
Empirically, however, it is more difficult to separate the networks and knowhow effect, 
since as the investor acquires experience and know-how, so she builds her network of 
contacts. Yet, evidence supports the coexistence of both effects for U.S. investments 
(Hochberg et al., 2007). In this dissertation I complement this earlier literature by testing 
the coexistence of both effects in an international sample.  
Besides, I will consider different measures of the experience of the investor. 
Research has shown that there is an economically relevant difference in performance of 
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investors in the top percentile compared to the average investor (Kaplan & Schoar, 2005). 
This finding suggests that tenure and experience alone are not enough to achieve a 
sustainable competitive advantage; on the contrary, only a few investors seem to build the 
capabilities and resources that can grant above normal returns. This has implications on 
how investors’ experience should be measured. In this dissertation I will propose that to 
understand the value added it is necessary to consider the successful experience, and not 
the bulk of experience, since this successes evidence learning. This is not to say there 
cannot be learning from failure; rather, if there is learning, success should follow. 
Proposition 2.1: Investors’ successful experience evidences valuable relational 
resources, and as such, a source of competitive advantage for new ventures.  
Proposition 2.2: The centrality and the brokerage position of the investor within 
the syndication network are valuable relational resources and a source of 
competitive advantage for new ventures.  
This heterogeneity among venture capital firms poses an additional empirical 
challenge: not only do venture capital firms differentially impact performance depending 
on their characteristics, but the best venture capital firms are typically matched to the best 
ventures. The literature has documented two simultaneous selection processes: venture 
capital firms select ventures based on their quality (e.g. Baum & Silverman, 2004), 
location (Sorenson & Stuart, 2001) or institutional environment (Guler & Guillen, 
2010b); and ventures select venture capital firms based on their reputation (Hsu, 2004). 
In my dissertation, I sought to separate the effects of selection from the value-added 
processes.  
7 
The Role of Investors in the Innovation Process 
The ability of firms to innovate is one of the central topics in strategy, because it 
impacts firm performance under certain appropriability conditions (Teece, 1986; Winter, 
2000). Much research has analyzed the determinants of a firm’s innovative performance. 
It has been suggested, for instance, that the locus of innovation resides in the 
relationships of the firm, including investment partnerships (Powell, Koput, & Smith-
Doerr, 1996). I seek to contribute to this stream of research by analyzing how investor 
mix impacts the innovative activities of young entrepreneurial ventures.  
 There is a common belief that venture capital investing is one of the main reasons 
for the fruitful innovation in the last decades. In fact, the evidence seems to indicate so: 
increases in venture capital activity in the U.S. during the 80s were associated with 
significantly higher patenting rates, even after addressing causality concerns (Kortum & 
Lerner, 2000). A plausible explanation could be the matching of the venture capitalists 
with the most innovative ventures. In effect, innovator firms attract more venture capital 
funding than imitator firms (Hellmann & Puri, 1998), maybe because patents signal 
quality (Hsu & Ziedonis, 2008).  
 An alternative, but complementary, explanation is that venture capital firms add 
value to the innovative process of the firm. Indeed, venture capital backed firms market 
their innovations faster than non venture capital backed firms (Hellmann & Puri, 1998). 
The experience of venture capital firms may be valuable in managing the R&D process in 
the specific firm, as suggested by the CEO of a biotech venture in an interview: “They 
have a better sense as to what R&D projects will be easier to commercialize in the future, 
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and they helped us focus.”2
Proposition 3.1: The knowledge of the technological landscape and the network 
advantages of the investor are valuable resources in the venture’s R&D process. 
Proposition 3.2: The more industry experience of the investment syndicate, the 
greater the innovation output of the venture.  
 In sum, certain resources and abilities of venture capital firms 
can foster the venture’s innovative process. Consistent with the relational view of the 
firm and resource-dependence theory, ventures that partner with such venture capital 
firms will be more successful in their innovation process. Hence, I propose: 
Venture Capital Investing Across Institutional Environments 
Venture capital investing is today a global phenomenon (for details see: Deloitte, 
2009). Recent research has studied the decision of the venture capitalists to enter a 
particular country, as explained by the host country institutional environment and by the 
investor’s network position (Guler & Guillen, 2010a, 2010b). Interestingly, once the 
decision to enter is made, they invest in ventures with a similar risk profile (Guler & 
McGahan, 2006). The globalization of this industry brings up new opportunities for 
investors, but also for research, since it allows us to study how firms add value differently 
in different institutional environments.  
Previous research has explored the contingencies of the value added by investors 
depending on the cycles of financial markets. Gulati and Higgins (2003) found that while 
reputed investors generally reduce the information asymmetries to third parties by 
endorsing a venture, this effect is greater when IPO markets are cold, since third parties 
                                                 
2 Interview with the CEO of a Spanish biotechnology firm, Dec-27-2005, Madrid, Spain. 
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assume the investor has put more effort in the due diligence process. More generally one 
would expect that in those situations with greater uncertainty, the effect of being 
endorsed by a highly reputed investor are greater than in environments that are more 
predictable. Similarly, the know-how that an investor may provide to a venture may be 
more valuable when there is more uncertainty, since there is a greater performance gap to 
be covered.  
Proposition 4.1: The positive effect of investors’ networks and resources on the 
performance of entrepreneurial ventures will be greater when the environment of 
the venture is more uncertain. 
Dissertation Outline 
This dissertation consists of three essays which study how investors experience 
and network position influence the performance and innovative outcomes of firms 
differently across different institutional environments. Using an international sample of 
biotechnology firms, I examine the variation across different environments of different 
relationships: chapter 2 examines the effect of investor experience on entrepreneurial 
firm performance; chapter 3 examines the effect of investor experience on the innovative 
outcomes of entrepreneurial firms; finally, chapter 4 analyzes the extent to which the 
effect of investor experience on both outcomes derives from the know-how or the 
networks of the investor.  
10 
Investors’ Experience and Venture’s Performance (Chapter 2) 
 Strategy scholars have shown the relevance of firm experience for performance, 
not just as a learning mechanism (Argote, 1999) but also as the necessary path to 
accumulate resources that may bring a competitive advantage to the firm (Dierickx & 
Cool, 1989). Hence, it should not be surprising that firms benefit from the experience of 
their investors. That said, attracting experienced partners comes at a price (Hsu, 2004), 
and so it becomes relevant to understand when this experience of the investors more 
impact on the performance of the entrepreneur.  
 Past research has focused on answering the question of how investors may add 
value to the firm, or in other words, what they may bring to the venture in different 
situations. Resource-dependence scholars have analyzed the impact of the board 
composition on firm performance when firms are on the verge of bankruptcy, finding that 
external directors and director interlocks allow the firm to access more external resources 
and manage the environmental uncertainty better (Daily & Dalton, 1994a, 1994b). 
Entrepreneurship scholars have found that entrepreneurial firms benefit from having 
prominent affiliates (Stuart et al., 1999), that investors use their human resource 
management know-how to professionalize the top management teams and human 
resource policies of startups (Hellmann & Puri, 2002), or that investors foster the 
formation of commercialization alliances of startups (Hsu, 2006). Scant research has 
focused, however, on the contingencies of these effects. Gulati and Higgins’ (2003) 
study, which finds that the signaling effect of having a very reputed investors is 
attenuated when financial markets are hot. Sapienza (1992) proposed several 
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contingencies of when investors add more value, including some contextual variables 
such as the stage of the venture and environmental uncertainty.  
 Chapter 2 analyzes how the effect of investors’ experience on firm performance 
changes over the life cycle of the venture, and across institutional environments. I will 
argue that when the entrepreneurial firm faces greater uncertainty from the environment, 
the effect of investor experience is accentuated. Thus, I predict that the effect should be 
greater earlier in the life cycle of the venture. I also expect a greater effect of investors’ 
experience when financial markets are less developed, because it is more difficult for the 
venture to access external resources that may be critical for growth. Nonetheless, when 
the environment uncertainty is such that the investors may not appropriate the returns to 
their investment, they may have incentives to focus their attention and their human 
resources on other firms in the portfolio; hence, I predict the effect of investors’ 
experience to be attenuated. 
 Empirically, the challenge lies in separating the effect of investors’ experience on 
performance from the matching of investors and firms. It is well known that investors 
select which firms they invest in, and that firms also choose their investors (Amit, 
Brander, & Zott, 1998; Baum & Silverman, 2004; Hsu, 2004; Sørensen, 2007). The 
empirical strategy will address these concerns by using a two-stage selection model. 
While the interest of this dissertation is on entrepreneurial firm performance, it is 
challenging to find comparable financial information for entrepreneurial firms. Instead, I 
examine the occurrence of an initial public offering or an acquisition, both of which are 
relevant milestones for investors and entrepreneurs, and have being used in the 
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entrepreneurship literature (e.g. Amit et al., 1998; Jeng & Wells, 2000; Stuart & 
Sorenson, 2003). While most research studies have focused on the occurrence of an IPO 
as the first best, previous research has shown that the occurrence of an acquisition is also 
an important milestone, sometimes preferred (Ragozzino & Reuer, 2007). In this chapter 
I will consider both effects. 
Investors’ Experience and Innovative Outcomes (Chapter 3) 
 There is a widespread belief that venture capital investments have spurred the 
growth and innovative outcomes of the firms they invest in; and this belief has fostered 
the growth of the venture capital industry across different countries. It is well known that 
part of this association comes from a selection effect; unlike other investors, venture 
capital firms have developed a distinctive ability to identify promising ventures in 
dynamic environments (Amit et al., 1998). However, it is economically important to 
know if there is an effect beyond selection. Kortum and Lerner (2000) found that even 
after controlling for the selection effects, venture capital firms spurred innovative 
outcomes in the United States.  
  There is still much to be learned about the mechanisms by which this may 
happen. Chapter 3 seeks to fill this gap by analyzing whether there is an effect and by 
proposing some mechanisms by which it may happen. I argue that in addition to selection 
and providing access to capital, investors may spur the innovation processes by (1) by 
increasing the general efficiency of the firm, freeing resources and attention that can be 
focused on the innovative outcomes, and (2) by influencing the technological trajectory 
of the firm, such that the innovative efforts are focused on applications with a higher 
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application potential. In other words, the investors’ knowledge about how to manage 
innovative ventures and about the landscape of innovations may have a positive effect on 
the innovative outcomes of firms. 
 Just as the effect of experience on firm performance may vary across institutional 
environments, the effect on innovation may vary as well. Zhao (2006) coins the term 
“institutional arbitrage” to explain why some firms enter environments which are less 
desirable when they provide a competitive advantage. In this chapter I will argue that 
when the regulatory environment is less stable, and so the regulations applying to the 
R&D processes may change, knowledge about the innovation landscape may be more 
useful. Hence, I expect the effect of investor experience to be greater in these situations. 
 Empirically, I test the effect of the experience of investors on three different 
innovative outcomes: patents, publications, and patent forward citations. While these are 
measures of the output, and not about the process itself, they generally refer to an earlier 
part of the innovation process. That is, they are better measures of inventions than they 
are of innovations. As a result, these measures allow me to understand better the earlier 
steps of the innovation process than that of the commercialization strategy, and provide a 
stronger test of the effect of investors on the R&D process. 
 Jointly, these two essays allow us to understand how investors affect the 
performance of entrepreneurial ventures, by analyzing differently the impact on a more 
financial outcome (the occurrence of an IPO or an acquisition) and the impact on a 
process outcome (innovation). Evidence that investors have an impact on the innovative 
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outcomes of firms provides a process explanation for the impact on the more general 
performance. 
Investors’ Know-How or Investors’ “Know-Whom”? (Chapter 4) 
 The two first essays of the dissertation seek to answer the question of when 
investor experience adds more value to entrepreneurial firms. The third essay 
complements the previous two by analyzing two potential mechanisms by which the 
experience of investors may add value, namely the knowhow and the “know whom” or 
network resources, and how these two mechanisms vary across different institutional 
environments.  
 There are two main explanations in past research of how investors may add value 
to their portfolio firms. First, by endorsing entrepreneurial firms, investors reduce the 
information asymmetries to third parties (Amit et al., 1998; Megginson & Weiss, 1991; 
Stuart et al., 1999). There is, then, a certification effect, or a reputation transfer, which 
changes the perception about the firm. Besides a reputation endorsement, the literature 
has identified other effects that have a real impact on the processes of the entrepreneurial 
firm, such as professionalizing the top management team (Hellmann & Puri, 2002) or 
fostering commercial alliances (Hsu, 2006). I will call this second group the “value 
added” explanations, which is not to say that a reputation transfer is not valuable. In fact, 
it is difficult to separate the two processes empirically, because they are correlated by 
definition (experienced investors are likely to have both the knowhow and the networks 
of contacts). Nevertheless, there is a theoretical interest in understanding these processes 
better. 
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 Using a sample of US investments, Hochberg et al (2007) found that both effects 
coexist and are correlated. Even though more may be better, the prevalence of these 
effects may change across different institutional environments. Chapter 4 contributes to 
this stream of literature by analyzing the different effects of the investors’ network 
position and experience across different institutional environments. This chapter builds 
both theoretically and empirically on the previous two chapters to provide a better answer 
to the overarching question of this dissertation: how and when investors add value to 
entrepreneurial ventures. 
Data and Method 
The empirical setting for this dissertation is a sample of biotechnology 
entrepreneurs that have obtained funding from venture capital firms, strategic partners, 
government-sponsored institutions, or financial institutions. Focusing on the 
biotechnology industry allows me to define a rather homogeneous measure of quality for 
the entrepreneurs, based on patents and publications (Darby & Zucker, 2002; Graham, 
Hall, Harhoff, & Mowery, 2002; Stuart et al., 1999), and to control for the standard 
timing of funding, IPO, and/or acquisition. Although it would be appealing to study the 
variation across different types of investors, they differ greatly in their degree of 
involvement, the type of resources shared, and the time allocated to each investment. To 
avoid this noise, I choose to focus on venture capital firms, building on a vast literature 
that documents how they tend to share their expertise, resources, and networks with their 
portfolio firms (Gompers & Lerner, 2004; Gorman & Sahlman, 1989). To gain a better 
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understanding of the processes underlying the motivations of venture capitalists, I 
conducted informal interviews with venture capital firms and biotechnology firms.  
Using VentureXpert (Thompson Financial) I collected all biotechnology firms 
that received funding from any investor, including angels, venture capital firms, and 
government-sponsored programs, and that were founded between 1990 and 2004. 
Overall, the sample consists of 688 firms from as many as 30 different countries. 
VentureXpert, the most comprehensive cross-national database of investments, collects 
the full investment history for each firm, including funding by government-affiliated 
institutions, financial institutions, strategic investors, or venture capital firms. The 
database has been widely used in both the entrepreneurship (Megginson & Weiss, 1991; 
Sahlman, 1990; Shane & Stuart, 2002) and the multinational literatures (Guler & Guillen, 
2010a, 2010b; Guler & McGahan, 2006, 2007).  
To measure the network position of the investments I need more information 
about the whole set of investments, and not just investments in the firms in the sample. 
Therefore, I gathered all the investment information from VentureXpert between 1987 
and 2004, for investments in any industry and located in any country. With the help of 
several research assistants, I cleaned the database to match investment and investor 
information, and identified the venture capital firms in the network. Following previous 
literature on dynamic networks, I defined an investment relationship (or tie) between two 
firms if they had co-invested in the same round of investment in the past 3 years. Overall, 
there are 116,453 investments between 1987 and 2004.  
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Endogeneity is the more challenging empirical concern with this dissertation. 
Investors select the firms they invest in, and firms also select their investors. Hence, 
before concluding investors have an effect on the performance of entrepreneurial firms it 
is necessary to understand the extent to which “good” investors are matched with well 
performing firms. Chapters 2 and 3 follow two different empirical strategies, the details 
of which are explained at length in the respective methodology sections. The advantage 
of using different methodologies across the dissertation is that it provides some sort of 
triangulation. Finding consistent results considering different dependent variables and 
methodologies should increase the confidence in the presence of a value added effect of 
investors beyond selection. 
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2. Investors’ Experience and Firm Performance  
Introduction 
Ever since the separation of ownership from control of the modern corporation, 
the link between investors and firm performance has been a central topic in the business 
literature, which has suggested that investors add value to the firm by providing access to 
their resources and networks of contacts. The resource provision role of investors is 
particularly relevant for entrepreneurial ventures. Fraught with change within the 
organization and its external environment, ventures can obtain a competitive advantage 
from having access to a broader array of resources that complements their growing asset 
base. Both business scholars and practitioners have asked the questions of whether 
investors can add value to startups, and which investors or which resources can create 
more value. However, to add value investors not only should have valuable resources but 
they have to make their resources available to the venture. Therefore, to unveil the 
process by which investors may impact the performance of startups it is important to 
understand the incentives to contribute their resources to the partnership.  
From a resource-dependence perspective, investors may increase the performance 
of the firms they invest in by providing access to their resources, hence increasing the 
firms’ effective resource bases for adapting to the environment (Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978). Much of the empirical work in this tradition has analyzed the performance 
consequences of outside directors and interlocks, arguing that these provide access to a 
broader array of resources and information that may confer an advantage to the firm in 
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situations of higher uncertainty (Boyd, 1990; Daily & Dalton, 1994a; Pfeffer, 1972). 
Entrepreneurial ventures, in particular, can leverage the expertise of the investors on the 
board to compensate for their own management’s lack of expertise of, thus improving 
performance (Kor & Misangyi, 2008; Kroll, Walters, & Le, 2007). Entrepreneurship 
scholars have also addressed the question of how investors in general, and venture capital 
firms in particular, may add value to startup performance and the processes by which this 
happens, including reputation endorsements (Megginson & Weiss, 1991; Stuart et al., 
1999) and the leverage of network resources (Hochberg et al., 2007; Hsu, 2006).  
However, just as firms collaborate to generate synergies from their strategic 
alliances (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Lavie, 2006), investors have to make their resources 
available to add value to the startup; and to do this, investors should have the right 
incentives. This chapter seeks to explore how investors’ incentives to share resources 
with their ventures moderate the performance consequences of investors’ expertise. I 
argue that experienced investors have accumulated the resources that may enhance the 
performance of entrepreneurial ventures. However, the effect of these valuable resources 
on venture performance is moderated by the extent to which investors have incentives to 
share those resources. I hypothesize that the performance effect of investors’ expertise 
should be greater in the early stages of a firm’s development, when the financial 
environment is less developed, and when the hazard of appropriation of the return is 
greater.  
I test these arguments with a global sample of 688 biotechnology ventures 
founded between 1990 and 2003. A focus on venture capital firms is not new to the 
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management literature (Arthurs, Hoskisson, Busenitz, & Johnson, 2008; Fischer & 
Pollock, 2004; Fitza, Matusik, & Mosakowski, 2009; Guler & Guillen, 2010a); these 
firms are one of the major investors in entrepreneurial ventures, and they collaborate with 
the top management in shaping the strategic decision making to increase a startup’s 
chances of success. However, the extent to which they do so varies across firms and 
institutional environment (Bottazzi, Da Rin, & Hellmann, 2008; Guler & McGahan, 
2006), and so it is appropriate to use a global study.  
Measuring the performance of startups presents many problems. Most research 
focuses on the occurrence of an initial public offering (IPO) (Darby & Zucker, 2002; 
Kroll et al., 2007; Stuart et al., 1999), since it is generally accepted that only good-
performing firms are taken public and that investors generally prefer this option (Jeng & 
Wells, 2000). Though less commonly examined in the literature, acquisitions are also 
related to a venture’s performance and are used as an alternative to an IPO under certain 
macroeconomic conditions, or even as the final objective for investors (Ragozzino & 
Reuer, 2007). Hence, while the main interest of the chapter is on entrepreneurial firm 
performance, I develop hypotheses in terms of the likelihood of occurrence of either an 
IPO or an acquisition. 
Investors’ Resources 
Resource-dependence theory has long studied the link between the resource 
provision role of investors and firm performance. This theory posits that when 
organizations lack the necessary resources to adapt to changes in the environment, they 
depend more on external resources and face greater uncertainty (Pfeffer & Salancik, 
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1978). Empirical tests have focused on how firms manage environmental uncertainty by 
adapting the composition of the board of directors. Firms that face more uncertainty tend 
to have boards with a higher number of interlocks, which suggests that directors with 
more connections to other firms have access to a greater pool of external resources that 
are valuable for the firm on the verge of change (Boyd, 1990; Pfeffer, 1972). A subset of 
this literature is concerned with how low-performing firms use the board of directors to 
avoid bankruptcy. In a matched sample design, Daily and Dalton (1994a, 1994b) found 
that bankrupt firms tend to have a lower proportion and a lower number of independent 
directors.  
More recent empirical work on resource-dependence theory has shifted the 
attention to how entrepreneurial ventures depend on the external environment to obtain 
the resources they lack internally in order to overcome their liability of newness. For 
instance, young ventures supplement their top management’s industry experience by 
appointing experienced outside directors (Kor & Misangyi, 2008); furthermore, when 
these outside directors provide advice and counsel to top management, rather than simply 
monitoring their actions, young public firms experience higher performance (Kroll et al., 
2007).  
The problem of how investors contribute to a venture’s performance, however, is 
not new. The entrepreneurial finance literature has long studied how startups benefit from 
the partnership with investors such as venture capital firms, which have a high stake in 
the firm and whose business model involves collaborating with the firm to improve 
performance (Gompers & Lerner, 2004; Gorman & Sahlman, 1989). Overall, there is 
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general agreement that firms backed by a venture capital firm perform better. Reputation 
endorsements are one of the mechanisms by which investors add value to the firm, since 
the venture needs time to build a reputation by itself (Megginson & Weiss, 1991; Stuart 
et al., 1999). Investors also add value by professionalizing the firm’s management team 
and human resource policies (Hellmann & Puri, 2002), leveraging their contacts to 
facilitate access to funding (Hochberg et al., 2007), and fostering critical strategic 
alliances (Hsu, 2006). In other words, startups often lack a reputation, networks of 
contacts, managerial capabilities, and industry know-how, and rely on their investors to 
gain immediate access to these resources while gradually building these resources 
internally. 
Finally, to understand how investors add value to the startups it is necessary to 
acknowledge that the matching between investors and startups is not random. On the 
contrary, investors that perform well have developed the ability to identify which 
ventures are more promising (Amit et al., 1998), and simultaneously the most promising 
ventures choose investors with a reputation that may be valuable to the firm (Hsu, 2004). 
In a world without frictions, we would expect to see the most reputed and experienced 
investors pair up with the most promising startups, not just building winners but picking 
them (Baum & Silverman, 2004). Previous research, however, suggests that the dynamics 
of this matching process are far from ideal. For instance, the best startups may choose not 
to invest in signaling their quality because it is costly (Amit, Glosten, & Muller, 1991); 
besides, the resources of investors are less valuable if the firm already has some of those 
resources (Barney, Busenitz, Fiet, & Moesel, 1996). Although it is not the goal of this 
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chapter to identify the matching and posterior influence processes, I will address the 
underlying mechanisms both in the theory and the empirics. 
Hypotheses Development 
Investors’ Expertise and Firm Performance 
 Previous research has shown that investors’ resources may impact the venture’s 
performance. Investors build a reputation, develop their network of contacts, and learn 
their managerial capabilities over time, as they accumulate industry and investment 
experience. Then, investors’ experience is a common antecedent to these resources and, a 
priori, one would expect that the most seasoned investors are those capable of enhancing 
firm performance. However, we know that the process of resource accumulation is filled 
with complexities and causal ambiguity (Dierickx & Cool, 1989), and cumulative 
experience may be necessary but not sufficient to accumulate these resources. On the 
contrary, investors — even the experienced ones — differ substantially in their returns. 
Some are persistently better than others (Kaplan & Schoar, 2005), which suggests that 
some may have resources that confer them with a competitive advantage. 
 In the process of building a reputation, a network of co-investors, or a network of 
portfolio companies, investors’ past successful experience may be especially important. 
This is particularly true for venture capital firms, which as financial intermediaries need 
to show good performance to future and current investors in order to maintain a 
reputation and secure a future flow of investments. Although both taking a company 
public and selling the company are considered successful liquidity events, the former has 
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a greater potential return — though also a greater risk — and it is used as a way to build a 
reputation (Gompers, 1996). Likewise, investors that have taken many companies public 
can reach to a portfolio of firms and contacts for resources or to foster strategic alliances 
(Hsu, 2006). In addition, as an attractive partner for syndication agreements they may 
receive more invitations to new syndicates that help consolidate a network of contacts 
(Lerner, 1994a). In short, success tends to feed success, and as investors accumulate 
resources that foster performance, they build a competitive advantage that is the basis for 
persistent returns. 
 The idea that investors’ IPO expertise impacts new venture performance is not 
new to the literature. It is generally accepted that resources are built and accumulated 
through experience and that, in turn, these resources may impact firm performance; in 
fact, the reputation of venture capital firms has often been measured by experience (Hsu, 
2004; Lerner, 1994a) or IPO experience (Hsu, 2006; Nahata, 2008). Because it has been 
shown that IPOs are not as prevalent globally as they are in the United States (Jelic, 
Saadouni, & Wright, 2005),3
In sum, those investors that have taken companies public in the past have built a 
reputation for being successful and had the opportunity to build a network of portfolio 
 it is necessary to establish a baseline effect that will then be 
used to measure the moderating role of incentives in the remainder of this chapter.  
                                                 
3 Because M&As are not as prevalent in some countries, investors’ M&A experience may also be 
instrumental in building some of these resources, such as a reputation or a network of co-investors. 
However, investors’ IPO and M&A experience should be correlated, and the former is still considered in 
the industry a signal of success.  
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companies, co-investments, and contacts, resources that are valuable for entrepreneurial 
ventures and that can impact their performance positively.4
Hypothesis 2-1: Investors’ past IPO experience increases the chances of the 
venture going public or being acquired. 
 
Incentives and the Round of Investment 
 Investors’ expertise, as an antecedent to accumulating valuable resources, may 
enhance the venture’s performance. However, for a venture to benefit from the resources 
of investors it is necessary that investors share these resources; in other words, the two 
organizations must collaborate. The alliance literature has emphasized this need for 
collaboration, positing that some organizational complementarities — “the organizational 
mechanisms necessary to access the benefits from complementary strategic resources” 
(Dyer & Singh, 1998:668) — must be developed in order for firms to create value from 
the alliance. Moreover, Lavie (2006) suggests that the creation of value within the 
alliance depends not just on the value of the resources of both parties, but on the extent to 
which these resources are shared. The remainder of this chapter analyzes three conditions 
that moderate investors’ incentives to share their resources with the ventures they fund. 
 One of the circumstances that change this incentive structure is the round of 
investment. As an entrepreneurial venture develops and meets milestones, such as having 
a product, starting commercialization, or making profits, investors provide additional 
                                                 
4Unobserved heterogeneity is a potential concern, since the investors’ expertise at exiting investments 
could proxy for a propensity to take companies public. However, these concerns are mitigated for three 
reasons: first, the dependent variable also includes the occurrence of an acquisition; second, the decision to 
take a company public is the result of consensus among all the investors in the syndicate, so the propensity 
of a particular investor may not be as relevant to the outcome; third, there is usually a substantial lag 
between the variables. 
26 
stages or rounds of funding for the subsequent phase of development. Staging the 
investment in this way is one of the mechanisms investors use to control the risk of their 
investment (Gompers, 1995). Then, as the venture goes through more rounds of 
investment, there is less uncertainty about the probability of an IPO or an acquisition in 
the near future, more investors involved in the firm, and also an asset base capable of 
conferring a competitive advantage. 
 The changes that come with an additional round of investment, however, may also 
change the incentives of investors to share their resources and know-how with the firm. 
First, as the venture develops, it accumulates resources of its own, partly by taking 
advantage of the resources investors may have brought in earlier rounds, such as a 
defined set of human resources policies, a capable management team, or promising 
commercialization alliances (Hellmann & Puri, 2002; Hsu, 2006). With more in-house 
resources, the return to external resources of investors is smaller. In addition, as rounds of 
investment unfold the investors’ strategy changes. Early-stage investors tend to have 
narrower portfolios to which they devote much time, while later-stage investors tend to 
be more diversified and as result devote less attention to each firm. In sum, with more 
later-stage investors in the syndicate there is likely to be a smaller effect of investors’ 
resources on firm performance because of a lesser degree of involvement. 
Empirical evidence suggests that investors are more committed to increasing the 
value of the startup in the early stages than in the last stages. In a study of the patterns of 
syndication (i.e., co-investment) of venture capital firms, Lerner (1994a) found that they 
seek partners with similar experience in the first round and less experienced partners in 
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later rounds. Although this pattern is consistent with seeking a second opinion, further 
research has shown that this syndication also adds value to the venture (Brander, Amit, & 
Antweiler, 2002). In addition, qualitative evidence supports the idea that investors in 
early rounds contribute to shaping the strategy of entrepreneurial ventures. Gorman and 
Sahlman (1989) found that allocation of time is strongly related to the stage at which the 
investor enters the firm. Lead investors and investors on the first round tend to attend 
monthly meetings, though investors in later rounds tend to go only to quarterly board 
meetings. One of the reasons first round investors maintain their presence in further 
rounds is explained by the impact of the due diligence process conducted in the first 
round of investment. “The relevance of the due diligence process is usually 
underestimated,” explained a venture capitalist in an interview. “Due diligence is a value-
added process. When we write the term sheet, we establish the terms for the whole deal, 
such as the composition of the management team. At board meetings we just stick to 
what we decided then, of course, making changes when necessary.” 5
In sum, even though experienced investors may have accumulated valuable 
resources that are capable of enhancing the performance of the venture, this process 
requires a transfer of resources. As the venture experiences additional rounds of 
investment, the incentives of investors to share their resources diminish. 
  
Hypothesis 2-2: The effect of investors’ past IPO experience on the chances of the 
venture going public or being acquired is greater during the first round of 
investment than in subsequent rounds. 
                                                 
5 Interview with a venture capitalist, Philadelphia (PA), April 2008. 
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Incentives and the Financial Environment 
The incentives of investors to share their resources and expertise with the ventures 
are moderated not only by the stage of development of the venture, but also by the stage 
of development of the financial environment. Even though investors generally prefer 
countries with strong financial environments, sometimes they can exploit arbitrage 
opportunities in less favorable environments, especially if they have a superior ability to 
identify the best deals. Once they make the investment, however, investors are locked in, 
because divesting is more difficult than investing. Therefore, they have the right 
incentives to share their expertise and their networks of contacts with the venture to 
increase its chances of success.  
The development of stock markets in general and their liquidity in particular 
varies widely across countries and time. According to the World Bank, in 2004 the 
turnover of stocks was 126% in the United States and 124% in Germany, but only 35% in 
Brazil and 48% in South Africa. Across time, stock market turnover in the United States 
increased from 54% in 1990 to 200% in 2001, with a decrease afterwards. Countries that 
have experienced rapid economic development have also seen increases in turnover; but 
although some countries such as India or Korea have more than doubled their turnover in 
the 1990-2004 period, countries such as Brazil have experienced a moderate increase 
(from 23% to 35%).  
International business researchers have studied the consequences of the variation 
of institutions across time, industries, and countries on the functioning of markets 
(Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson, 2001) and on the optimal strategies of firms (Guillen, 
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2000; Khanna & Palepu, 1997). A subset of this literature has documented the preference 
of investors for countries with well-developed financial institutions (Guler & Guillen, 
2010b), especially when they have an active IPO market (Jeng & Wells, 2000). Investors 
prefer to invest in countries with a very liquid stock exchange, since this facilitates 
divestment. This preference for more stable environments creates opportunities for 
arbitrage that investors with superior selection abilities may decide to pursue. The 
empirical evidence suggests, however, that in these cases investors may need to adapt 
their strategies, for instance by reducing the risk profile of their investments (Guler & 
McGahan, 2006) or reducing the number of investors in the syndicate (Guler & 
McGahan, 2007). 
Nevertheless, investors that pursue opportunities in less liquid financial 
environments face more difficulties in divesting or in attracting additional investors to the 
firm. As a result, not only they are locked into the investment, but they are the major 
source of funds for the venture in the years to come, hence having an incentive to share 
their expertise, resources, and networks with the firm in order to increase its chances of 
success. This is the case for institutional investors, whose large equity position precludes 
a quick divestment and favors a greater activism in corporate governance and operational 
decisions (Johnson & Greening, 1999; Pound, 1992). Besides being more active, 
investors may introduce the venture to their network of contacts in other countries, which 
may facilitate taking the company public in a foreign stock exchange that has better 
liquidity conditions than the local one (Hursti & Maula, 2007). Anecdotal evidence from 
an interview with the director of a venture capital firm suggests that sharing an investor’s 
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international network of contacts may facilitate a firm’s international operations, in turn 
facilitating a foreign IPO.6
Therefore, experienced investors may add value to their portfolio ventures if they 
have incentives to share their resources and expertise. When the local stock markets are 
not liquid, investors cannot easily divest and in turn they have incentives to collaborate 
with the venture to increase the chances of success.  
  
Hypothesis 2-3: The effect of investors’ past IPO experience on the chances of the 
venture going public or being acquired decreases as the liquidity of the local 
stock market increases. 
Incentives and the Hazard of Expropriation 
 The incentives of investors to share their resources and expertise with the ventures 
also depend on the appropriability of the returns. When the institutional environment is 
such that there is a lower likelihood of appropriating the returns, the investors have fewer 
incentives to provide the venture with access to their know-how or their networks of 
contacts. For investors, the degree of appropriability of returns depends to a great extent 
on the political institutions, and in particular on the level of political risk, defined as “the 
feasibility of a policy change by the host-country government which either directly — 
seizure of assets — or indirectly — adverse change in taxes, regulations or other 
agreements — diminishes the multinational’s expected return on assets” (Henisz, 
2000:334). Political actors can change the taxation benefits to equity gains, the voting 
privileges of investors on the board, the regulation of mergers and acquisitions, or the 
                                                 
6 Interview with the director of the Madrid office of a U.S. venture capital firm, Madrid (Spain), December 
2005. 
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disclosure requirements in an IPO, all of which affect the extent to which investors 
appropriate the value of their investment. Since the investment in startups is long term, an 
unstable regulatory environment greatly increases the hazard of expropriation of their 
investments, lowering the incentives to share their resources in the first place. 
 Previous research has shown that investors are less attracted to countries with a 
higher hazard of expropriation (Henisz, 2002). However, some firms are able to mitigate 
the risks of public expropriation; for instance, although multinational firms take smaller 
equity positions in countries with high risk of expropriation, firms with more 
international experience take more equity, which seems to indicate some experiential 
learning in dealing with these risks (Delios & Henisz, 2000). This experiential learning is 
also observed in foreign direct investment, since investors with experience in politically 
hazardous countries are more prone to enter countries with high political risks (Delios & 
Henisz, 2003). Thus, under some circumstances investors choose countries with higher 
political hazards, but adapt their strategies to mitigate those hazards. 
In particular, investors that choose to invest in startups located in countries with a 
greater hazard of expropriation have fewer incentives to share their resources and 
expertise with the startups. Sharing intangible resources, such as their industry or human 
resource management know-how, or their networks of contacts, is costly, because it 
requires the involvement of the investor’s specialized human resources, which is their 
most constrained asset. Investors allocate time and attention across different investments, 
and they have an incentive to allot more time to those investments that have a higher 
expected return. In addition, sharing an intangible resource always creates a risk of 
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imitation, because co-investors may learn from watching their routines, and are 
introduced to their network of contacts, improving their own position in the network. 
This also creates incentives not to share if there is a higher risk of expropriation. 
Therefore, experienced investors may add value to a venture by sharing their 
resources with it. However, when the hazard of expropriation is higher, investors have 
fewer incentives to make their resources fully available to the ventures, and then I expect 
a lower effect of investors’ experience on the startup’s performance.  
Hypothesis 2-4: The effect of investors’ past IPO experience on the chances of the 
venture going public or being acquired decreases as the hazard of expropriation 
increases. 
Methodology 
Research Setting 
 I empirically test the hypotheses in the setting of biotechnology entrepreneurs that 
have obtained funding from venture capital firms, strategic partners, government-
sponsored institutions, or financial institutions. Focusing on the biotechnology industry 
allows me to define a rather homogeneous measure of quality for the entrepreneurs, based 
on patents and publications (Darby & Zucker, 2002; Graham et al., 2002; Stuart et al., 
1999), and to control for the standard timing of funding, IPO, and/or acquisition. 
Although it would be appealing to study the variation across different types of investors, 
they differ greatly in their degree of involvement, the type of resources shared, and the 
time allocated to each investment. To avoid this noise, I choose to focus on venture 
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capital firms, building on a vast literature that documents how they tend to share their 
expertise, resources, and networks with their portfolio firms (Gompers & Lerner, 2004; 
Gorman & Sahlman, 1989). To gain a better understanding of the processes underlying 
the motivations of venture capitalists, I conducted informal interviews with venture 
capital firms and biotechnology firms.  
Sample 
Using VentureXpert I collected all biotechnology firms that received funding 
from any investor, including angels, venture capital firms, and government-sponsored 
programs, and that were founded between 1990 and 2004. VentureXpert, the most 
comprehensive cross-national database of investments, collects the full investment 
history for each firm, including funding by government-affiliated institutions, financial 
institutions, strategic investors, or venture capital firms. The database has been widely 
used in both the entrepreneurship (Megginson & Weiss, 1991; Sahlman, 1990; Shane & 
Stuart, 2002) and the multinational literatures (Guler & Guillen, 2010a, 2010b; Guler & 
McGahan, 2006, 2007).  
Since the window of observation is 2005 and all the independent variables are 
lagged, I include in the analyses only firms that are in the sample at least 2 years. The 
final sample comprises 688 firms from as many as 30 different countries (see Table 1). 
To maximize the variation in the external environment, the sample includes all firms 
founded outside the United States and a 10% random sample of the firms founded within 
the United States; sensitivity analyses were conducted excluding the U.S. firms to address 
potential concerns.   
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Table 2-1. Sample Description by Country of Origin 
Country Ventures VC- 
backed 
IPOs  M&As Founded  
(average) 
Duration 
 (average) 
Venture-
years 
Australia 32 14 5 3 1999 4.9 121 
Austria 4 4 1 1 1999 6.3 21 
Belgium 12 7 2 0 2000 4.8 46 
Brazil 7 4 0 0 2000 5.1 29 
Canada 51 38 9 6 1998 6.1 246 
China 3 0 1 0 1997 5.3 13 
Denmark 26 16 0 2 2000 5.0 93 
Finland 17 9 0 2 1997 7.3 101 
France 55 45 2 3 1998 6.6 280 
Germany 142 121 10 15 1998 6.5 748 
Hungary 1 1 0 0 1998 7.0 6 
India 7 2 2 0 1994 8.7 54 
Ireland 7 5 0 0 1998 6.9 38 
Israel 23 14 3 0 1998 6.6 121 
Italy 2 1 0 0 2002 3.5 5 
Japan 6 6 3 0 1998 6.3 28 
Malaysia 2 1 0 0 2002 3.5 5 
Netherlands 12 9 2 2 1998 5.7 49 
New Zealand 1 0 0 0 1995 9.0 8 
Norway 11 10 0 1 1997 7.8 67 
Portugal 2 2 0 0 1999 6.0 10 
Rep. of Korea 57 35 5 2 1999 6.1 292 
Singapore 2 1 0 0 2002 3.0 4 
South Africa 1 1 0 0 1999 6.0 5 
Spain 8 2 0 0 2000 4.6 29 
Sweden 25 22 0 1 1998 6.2 122 
Switzerland 19 19 4 3 1999 5.2 79 
Turkey 1 0 0 0 1999 6.0 5 
United Kingdom 75 52 8 14 1998 6.1 362 
United Statesa 77 70 10 15 1997 6.4 372 
Total 688 511 67 70 1998 6.2 3,359 
a For firms founded in the United States, analyses use a 10% random sample of the population; 
for other countries, all firms are included. 
 
Firms are followed since founding until they experience an IPO or an acquisition, 
or until 2005, and drop from the sample when they go bankrupt, spanning a total of 3,359 
venture-years, which is the unit of analysis. The sample is entrepreneurial by nature, as 
these are high-technology, private ventures, observed on average for their first seven 
years of existence (Autio, Sapienza, & Almeida, 2000).  
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Out of the total sample, I observe funding by a venture capital firm at some point 
in time for 511 of them (see Table 1). Because VC backing is not an inherent 
characteristic of a firm but rather changes across rounds and time, and because VC 
backing varies dramatically across countries, suggesting that it may be influenced by the 
variation in financial institutions and the hazard of appropriation, I keep both VC- and 
non-VC-backed firms. 
Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable is the occurrence of the first IPO in any stock exchange 
around the world or the occurrence of an Acquisition. Because stock markets vary to the 
extent that ventures can successfully attempt an IPO, and because on some occasions an 
acquisition is preferred (Ragozzino & Reuer, 2007), it is important to consider both 
liquidity events.7
Although it would be attractive to consider the valuation of the liquidity event 
and not just the occurrence, this raises serious comparability concerns. First, it would 
exclude from the analyses the ventures for which no event is observed, creating a bias 
towards the best performers. Second, it is difficult to compare the valuation of IPOs and 
acquisitions, because they are determined through very different processes. Finally, even 
comparing IPO valuations would be problematic, as there are 15 different stock 
 In fact, Table 1 shows that the distribution of both liquidity events 
varies dramatically across countries, which may evidence the heterogeneity in financial 
institutions across different countries, underscoring the need to include acquisitions in the 
analysis.  
                                                 
7 For four firms in the sample there was a reverse merger (i.e., the acquisition of a public company in order 
to bypass the process of an IPO). In the analyses these are also coded as a Liquidity Event. 
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exchanges involved, with 3 firms going public exclusively in a foreign stock exchange 
and 4 firms going public in the local stock exchange and a foreign stock exchange 
simultaneously. 
The occurrence of a liquidity event is characterized both by the Durationi, i.e., the 
number of years the venture is observed since its founding, and the LiquidityEventit 
indicator, which measures the occurrence of an event and its timing. Consider a firm that 
experiences an IPO in year 4: the Duration is 4 and the LiquidityEventit indicator is 0 for 
the three first years and 1 for the fourth year. If the observation were censored, then the 
LiquidityEventit indicator would be 0 for all years. Out of the 688 ventures in the sample, 
approximately 20% experience an IPO or an acquisition during the period of observation, 
and they are observed 7 years on average. The occurrence of an event was determined 
using a variety of sources, including VentureXpert, SDC Platinum (Global Issues and 
M&A Databases), Zephyr, stock exchanges’ websites, and company websites. All 
potential IPOs and acquisitions were confirmed with the Dow Jones Factiva news 
database, distinguishing real acquisitions from a sale of assets after bankruptcy. 
Independent Variables 
Syndicate variables. I measure the experience of the investors for each venture-
year as the total number of IPOs that venture capital firms have been involved in since 
founding up to that year. Using the whole VentureXpert database, I computed for each 
year and for each venture capital firm in the sample the number of past investments that 
ended up in an IPO, going back to 1967. For each venture-year, I calculate the sum of the 
experience of all venture capital firms. This measure is parsimonious and it respects the 
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idea that venture capital firms invite other firms to the syndicate not just to share 
financial responsibility, but also to take advantage of their expertise and capabilities 
(Brander et al., 2002). Then, the Experiencei,t-1 variable computes for each venture i the 
total number of IPOs in which any of the venture capital firms in the syndicate has been 
involved since it was founded until t-1. As a result, the variable varies across time when: 
a) more venture capital firms join the syndicate, and b) venture capital firms in the 
syndicate gain experience. 
Two indicators measure the round of investment: Round1it and OtherRoundit (for 
second and subsequent rounds); the omitted category is an indicator of the venture-years 
prior to the first round. I compute Experience*Round1i,t-1 as the interaction of 
Experiencei,t-1 and Round1i,t-1, and Experience*OtherRoundi,t-1 as the interaction of 
Experiencei,t-1 and OtherRoundi,t-1. Note that before the first round Experience is 0, 
because there are no investors. 
Other variables that describe the syndicate of investors are: a) SizeOfSyndicateit, 
which is a count of all the investors — whether they are venture capital firms or not — in 
the syndicate for each venture-year; b) an indicator of whether there is a 
FinancialInstitutionit in the syndicate for each venture-year; and c) VCit, an indicator of 
whether there is a venture capital firm in the syndicate for each venture-year. 
Country variables. Hypotheses 2-3 and 2-4 refer to the interaction between 
Experiencei,t-1 and institutional variables. Following the finance tradition, I operationalize 
the liquidity of the stock exchange market as the turnover ratio of stocks traded 
(Turnoverit), from the World Bank Development Indicators. I measure the hazard of 
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expropriation using the political constraints index developed by Henisz (2002), which 
estimates the feasibility of a policy change by taking into account the checks and 
balances among political actors. I define the variable Expropriationit as one minus the 
Polcon index, so the final variable increases with the expropriation hazard. 
To account for the cross-country institutional variation, I build on Guler and 
Guillen (2010b) and control for the level of economic development, as the GDP per 
capita (PPP), and for the stock exchange market capitalization, as percentage of the GDP, 
both from the World Bank. All regressions include country fixed effects for the most 
frequent countries. In unreported regressions I controlled for whether a country is a 
common law country (from the World Bank) and for new listings in stock markets (from 
the World Federation of Exchanges, available since 1995).  
Venture characteristics. Patents and publications are the typical indicator of 
quality for a biotechnology firm (Darby & Zucker, 2002). For each of the venture-years I 
compiled the total number of patents (at the application date) affiliated with the firm, 
from the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. This is a homogeneous measure of quality 
across different countries, because “in the biotechnology industry firms usually patent in 
the most relevant countries at the same time in order to ensure protection.” 8
Besides venture quality, I control for: a) YearOfFoundingi, to control for the year 
the venture enters the sample, b) BioPharmai, an indicator of whether the main activity of 
 I compiled 
all the publications of scientists affiliated with the venture for each venture-year using the 
ISI Web of Knowledge. The Patentsit and Publicationsit variables measure the stock of 
patents/publications of venture i at time t, for each venture-year. 
                                                 
8 Interview with a patent lawyer, Philadelphia (PA), September 2007. 
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the firm is biopharmaceuticals, c) and Spin-offi, which is 1 if the firm is a spin-off of a 
pharmaceutical company or a research institution. 
Analyses 
Given that the dependent variable is coded as one if, and only if, a liquidity event 
takes place, and zero otherwise, not only there is a strong dependence across time, but 
also right censoring for those ventures that do not experience an event during the window 
of observation. The most appropriate technique to deal with this data structure is event 
history analysis; I estimate Cox regression models, which do not impose a particular 
functional form on the underlying hazard of an event. I chose the venture-year as the unit 
of analysis because most of the independent variables vary yearly. Lastly, the Cox model 
specification does not assume the proportionality of hazards when time-dependent 
covariates are included (Allison, 1995). 
In addition, there is a potential endogeneity problem because of the non-random 
matching between investors and ventures, which is such that investors try to select the 
most promising ventures and ventures try to select the most reputed investors (Amit et al., 
1991; Hsu, 2004). The nature of the dependent variable attenuates the concerns with 
some sources of endogeneity, since it is more difficult to predict when or if a liquidity 
event will happen than it is to predict financial performance Nevertheless, it is important 
to address the matching empirically. The ideal way to deal with this problem is to 
develop (1) a self-selection model, including (2) an exogenous instrument to control for 
the matching on unobservable characteristics, and then (3) include the correction on the 
second stage. I consider these three components one at a time.  
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Departing from the literature on alliance formation (Gulati, 1995; Podolny, 1994; 
Stuart, 1998) and following Bottazzi et al. (2008), I generate all potential matches 
between investors and ventures by matching for each year all syndicates that were 
actively searching for investments and all ventures that were active in the sample. Then, I 
estimate the likelihood of an actual match using a probit model. In this model I 
incorporate interactions of the characteristics of the investors that may potentially join 
with characteristics of the investors in t-1, to control for patterns in the firms that are 
invited. I control, as well, for the potential matching between investors and high-quality 
ventures.  
Besides a matching on the observed variables there is also a potential matching on 
unobserved characteristics,9 and so an exogenous instrument should be included in the 
selection model as an additional regressor. Previous research has used the supply of funds 
in the geographical area as an exogenous instrument for the matching (Berger, Miller, 
Petersen, Rajan, & Stein, 2005). I operationalize this supply following Bottazzi et al. 
(2008) by generating a set of Country Pairs Fixed Effects.10
The issue of how to incorporate a self-selection model with an event history 
analysis on the second stage is challenging. The ideal would be to estimate both stages 
jointly, as in Heckman (1979), but this is computationally complex. A cost-effective 
alternative involves a two-step approach, estimating first the selection model and 
 
                                                 
9 In fact, Sørensen found strong evidence of matching on unobserved variables (2007). 
10 For instance, if the venture is from Australia, and there are two investors from Germany and the U.K, the 
country pairs Australia-Germany and Australia-UK are 1 for that year, and all other country pairs are 0. 
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calculating the Inverse Mill’s ratio, which is then used in the second stage.11 Although 
the two-step approach has been widely used as an approximation in different contexts (Lu 
& Ma, 2008; Shaver, 1998), it should be interpreted with caution (Murphy & Topel, 
1985).12
Results 
 
 Descriptive statistics are shown in Table 2. On average, the syndicate of investors 
has an Experience of 11.6 IPOs, increasing with the round of investment. There is 
significant correlation among the main interactions. In non-reported regressions I 
centered the variables, but because results did not change I report the more parsimonious 
regressions. Even though the presence of multicollinearity does not bias the coefficients, 
it increases the variance, making the test more conservative. 
  
                                                 
11 The intuition for this technique is found in the idea of Inverse Probability Weighting estimators 
(Wooldridge, 2002b), and has some common ground with the propensity score estimation (Wooldridge, 
2002a).  
12 In particular, standard errors may be biased. I repeated the analysis using bootstrap; while results were 
mostly robust, the levels of significance dropped in some specifications. 
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Table 2-2. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations  
  mean s.d. min max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. LiquidityEventi,t a 0.19 0.39 0 1         
2. Durationi a 7.42 2.96 2 15 -.03        
3. Experiencei,t-1 11.6 37.2 0 366 .14 .03       
4. Experience 
*Round1,t-1 2.22 13.78 0 291 .07 -.06 .33      
5. Experience 
*OtherRoundi,t-1 9.39 35.18 0 366 .12 .06 .93 -.04     
6. Experience 
*Turnoveri,t-1 13.5 52.6 0 741 .10 .03 .91 .25 .87    
7. Experience 
*Expropriation i,t-1 6.61 21.8 0 219 .14 .04 .99 .31 .93 .92   
8. Round1i, t-1 0.40 0.49 0 1 -.09 -.15 -.13 .20 -.22 -.12 -.13  
9. OtherRound i, t-1 0.22 0.41 0 1 .10 .05 .45 -.09 .50 .38 .44 -.43 
10. VCi,t-1 0.47 0.50 0 1 .06 -.03 .34 .17 .28 .27 .32 .35 
11. SizeOfSyndicatei,t-1 1.62 2.34 0 21 .09 .01 .57 .09 .57 .50 .55 .02 
12. Financial 
Institutioni, t-1 0.21 0.40 0 1 .03 -.04 .16 -.01 .17 .13 .14 .13 
13. Expropriationi,t-1 0.54 0.08 0.26 1 .03 .03 .10 .03 .10 .11 .14 .01 
14. Turnoveri,t-1 1.11 0.69 0.09 3.80 -.08 -.10 .03 -.02 .04 .11 .03 .13 
15. GDPi,t-1 25.3 5.92 1.64 35.4 .04 -.10 .21 .07 .20 .23 .26 -.09 
16. StockMarketCapi,t-1 88.4 52.3 3.55 322 .10 -.06 .14 .07 .12 .13 .15 -.08 
17. Patentsi,t-1 1.30 3.20 0 40 .12 .17 .28 .01 .29 .23 .27 -.10 
18. Publicationsi,t-1 3.25 16.4 0 309 .02 .06 .11 .01 .12 .09 .11 .01 
19. BioPharmai 0.36 0.48 0 1 .14 -.13 .09 .06 .08 .07 .09 -.04 
20. YearOfFoundingi 1997 3.07 1990 2003 -.22 -.91 -.07 .02 -.08 -.05 -.07 .18 
21. Spin-offi 0.23 0.42 0 1 .13 -.09 .07 .04 .06 .03 .06 -.04 
  9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
10. VCi,t-1 .46            
11. SizeOfSyndicatei,t-1 .61 .58           
12. Financial 
Institutioni, t-1 .32 .21 .55          
13. Expropriationi,t-1 .08 .05 .03 -.04         
14. Turnoveri,t-1 .04 .09 .04 .01 .27        
15. GDPi,t-1 .23 .19 .20 .07 .00 -.18       
16. StockMarketCapi,t-1 .11 .04 .06 -.01 .12 -.12 .45      
17. Patentsi,t-1 .33 .23 .37 .17 .03 -.03 .17 .13     
18. Publicationsi,t-1 .12 .15 .15 .07 .05 -.04 .01 .01 .18    
19. BioPharmai .14 .13 .15 .10 .03 -.07 .16 .05 .08 .04   
20. YearOfFoundingi -.06 .02 -.02 .06 -.06 .14 .12 .04 -.19 -.07 .09  
21. Spin-offi .09 .04 .07 .06 .08 -.10 .10 .20 .11 .01 .14 .07 
Data from all countries; not weighted (common statistical packages do not allow weights with 
longitudinal data); all correlations larger than 0.03 are significant at p < 0.05; n = 3,359 venture-
years. 
a Dependent variable. 
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 The estimation results from the selection model are shown in Table 3. Crossing all 
active syndicates of investors with all active ventures for each year results in 185,798 
venture-years. To account for the non-independence of observations, I run a pooled probit 
regression clustering by venture, and I introduce year fixed effects.13
  
 The exogenous 
instruments are the Country Pairs Fixed Effects, which are highly significant. Both the 
characteristics of the incumbent syndicate and the characteristics of the matching 
syndicate significantly predict the occurrence of a matching. Overall the model shows 
good fit, with a pseudo R2 of 50%. Using this model, I computed the Inverse Mill’s ratio, 
which is then added as a regressor on the second stage. As shown in Table 4, the 
coefficient for the Inverse Mill’s Ratio is significant across specifications, suggesting the 
presence of a non-random matching on the first stage. 
                                                 
13 I do so because each venture appears multiple times per year and it is not feasible to use a fixed effects 
panel data model. 
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Table 2-3. Results of Probit Analysis on the Probability of Matching 
 (Selection)a  
Matching   
VCi,t -1.25** (0.36) 
VCi,t*VCi,t-1 -0.47** (0.11) 
VCi,t*Experiencei,t-1 b 0.00 (0.00) 
VCi,t*Patent stock i,t-1 0.02 (0.02) 
VCi,t*GDPi,t-1 0.03* (0.01) 
Syndicate controls   
Experiencei,t-1 b -0.01 (0.01) 
VCi,t-1 0.44** (0.10) 
Round1i,t-1 0.28** (0.06) 
OtherRound i,t-1 0.28** (0.07) 
SizeOfSyndicatei,t-1 0.10** (0.02) 
FinancialInstitutioni, t-1 -0.16* (0.07) 
Venture’s country controls   
Expropriationi,t-1 0.63 (0.61) 
Turnover i,t-1 0.08 (0.06) 
GDP i,t-1 -0.05** (0.01) 
StockMarketCapi,t-1 b -0.01 (0.01) 
Venture’s controls   
Patentsi,t-1 0.00 (0.01) 
Publicationsi,t-1 b -0.03** (0.01) 
BioPharmai -0.02 (0.05) 
YearOfFoundingi -0.00 (0.01) 
Spin-offi -0.12† (0.07) 
Constant 9.63 (21.82) 
Country Pairs Fixed Effects Yes  
Year fixed effects Yes  
a  Robust standard errors are in parentheses; n = 185,798 (all 
possible matches between active syndicates and ventures). 
b Experience, Publications, and StockMarketCap are linearly 
transformed (divided by 10); for interpretation, divide the 
coefficient by 10. 
    † p < 0.10 
    * p < 0.05 
  ** p < 0.01 
 
 Table 4 shows the results of the hypotheses testing on the second stage. The 
estimates for the control variables are robust across specifications. Hypothesis 2-1 
predicts that syndicates with more IPO experience will enhance the likelihood of the 
venture going public or being acquired. In support of hypothesis 2-1, the effect of 
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Experience is positive and significant (model 1), even when it is divided by round 
(models 2-5). Interestingly, the estimate for having a VC in the syndicate is positive but 
insignificant across specifications once the Experience of the venture capital firms is 
accounted for, suggesting that the process by which venture capital firms contribute to 
adding value is indeed through their resources and expertise.  
 
Table 2-4. Results of Cox Regression on the Hazard of an IPO or an Acquisition 
Dependent Variablea IPO or 
M&A 
 IPO or 
M&A 
 IPO or 
M&A 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  
Hypotheses       
(H2-1) Experiencei,t-1b 0.04* (0.02)     
(H2-2) Experiencei,t-1*Round1,t-1   0.09* (0.03) 0.16** (0.05) 
(H2-2) Experiencei,t-1*OtherRound,t-1   0.03 (0.02) 0.11** (0.04) 
(H2-3) Experiencei,t-1*Turnover i,t-1     -0.07* (0.03) 
(H2-4) Experiencei,t-*Expropriationi,t-1       
Syndicate Controls       
VCi,t-1 0.30 (0.30) 0.25 (0.30) 0.24 (0.30) 
FinancialInstitutioni, t-1 0.22 (0.23) 0.21 (0.23) 0.21 (0.23) 
SizeOfSyndicatei,t-1 0.02 (0.04) 0.03 (0.04) 0.03 (0.04) 
Round1,t-1 0.69† (0.35) 0.66† (0.35) 0.63† (0.35) 
OtherRound,t-1 0.88* (0.40) 0.95* (0.41) 0.85* (0.41) 
Venture Controls       
Patentsi,t-1 0.04* (0.07) 0.04* (0.02) 0.03* (0.02) 
Publicationsi,t-1b 0.02 (0.04) 0.02 (0.04) 0.02 (0.04) 
BioPharmai 0.51** (0.18) 0.51** (0.18) 0.51** (0.18) 
Spin-offi 0.11 (0.21) 0.11 (0.21) 0.10 (0.21) 
YearOfFounding 0.12** (0.04) 0.11** (0.04) 0.12** (0.04) 
Country Controls       
Turnover i,t-1 0.19 (0.24) 0.20 (0.23) 0.45† (0.26) 
Expropriationi,t-1 -2.61 (2.08) -2.50 (2.06) -2.63 (2.06) 
GDP i,t-1 -0.02 (0.03) -0.02 (0.03) -0.02 (0.03) 
StockMarketCapi,t-1b 0.04† (0.02) 0.04† (0.02) 0.04 (0.02) 
Inverse Mill’s Ratioi,tc 1.15** (0.43) 1.09* (0.43) 1.08* (0.43) 
Country Fixed Effects    Yes     Yes     Yes  
(continues…) 
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(…continued) 
Dependent Variablea IPO or 
M&A 
 IPO or 
M&A 
 
 (4)  (5)  
Hypotheses     
(H2-1) Experiencei,t-1b     
(H2-2) Experiencei,t-1*Round1,t-1 0.35** (0.11) 0.39** (0.11) 
(H2-2) Experiencei,t-1*OtherRound,t-1 0.31** (0.12) 0.36** (0.12) 
(H2-3) Experiencei,t-1*Turnover i,t-1   -0.06* (0.03) 
(H2-4) Experiencei,t-1*Expropriationi,t-1 -0.48* (0.20) -0.43* (0.20) 
Syndicate Controls     
VCi,t-1 0.23 (0.30) 0.22 (0.30) 
FinancialInstitutioni, t-1 0.16 (0.23) 0.17 (0.23) 
SizeOfSyndicatei,t-1 0.03 (0.04) 0.03 (0.04) 
Round1,t-1 0.67† (0.35) 0.64† (0.35) 
OtherRound,t-1 0.94* (0.41) 0.85* (0.41) 
Venture Controls     
Patentsi,t-1 0.03* (0.02) 0.03* (0.02) 
Publicationsi,t-1b 0.02 (0.04) 0.01 (0.04) 
BioPharmai 0.54** (0.18) 0.53** (0.18) 
Spin-offi 0.03 (0.22) 0.02 (0.22) 
YearOfFounding 0.11** (0.04) 0.11** (0.04) 
Country Controls     
Turnover i,t-1 0.14 (0.23) 0.42 (0.26) 
Expropriationi,t-1 -0.27 (2.19) -0.63 (2.21) 
GDP i,t-1 -0.02 (0.03) -0.02 (0.03) 
StockMarketCapi,t-1b 0.04* (0.02) 0.04* (0.02) 
Inverse Mill’s Ratioi,tc 1.11* (0.43) 1.09* (0.43) 
Country Fixed Effects    Yes     Yes  
a  Robust standard errors are in parentheses; n = 3,359; country fixed effects for 
United States, Germany, United Kingdom, France, and Rep. of Korea.  
b Experience, Publications, and StockMarketCap are linearly transformed (divided 
by 10); for interpretation, divide the coefficient by 10. 
c Inverse Mill’s Ratio calculated from the results of the selection equation (stage 1). 
    † p < 0.10 
    * p < 0.05 
  ** p < 0.01 
 
 
Hypothesis 2-2 predicts that the effect of Experience should be greater on the first 
round than in other rounds. Model 2 modifies model 1 by testing separately the IPO 
experience of venture capital firms in the first round (Experience*Round1) and in other 
rounds (Experience*OtherRound). Models 3 to 5 maintain this division while adding 
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other independent variables. Considering all the models as a whole, the coefficient of 
Experience in both rounds is positive and significant. A two-tailed test of the difference 
of the coefficients supports that Experience*Round1 is greater than Experience*Round2, 
with p < 0.5 in model 2 and p < 0.1 in models 3 to 5. This evidence supports hypothesis 
2-2. 
  Hypothesis 2-3 predicts that the effect of Experience on the likelihood of a 
LiquidityEvent is attenuated when the turnover of the stock exchange is greater. As 
expected, the main effect of the stock exchange Turnover on the likelihood of a liquidity 
event is positive, although generally not significant. The interaction of 
Experience*Turnover, however, is negative and significant both in the partial and full 
models (3 and 5, respectively). Note that these results control for many other institutional 
variables, such as the GDP, the stock market capitalization, and country fixed effects for 
the most frequent countries. 
 Hypothesis 2-4 predicts that the effect of Experience on the likelihood of a 
LiquidityEvent is attenuated when the expropriation hazard is higher. Consistent with the 
literature on political risk (Delios & Henisz, 2000, 2003), the main effect of 
Expropriation is negative. In support of hypothesis 2-4, the interaction of 
Experience*Expropriation is negative as well. 
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Figure 2-1. Effect of Experience by Level of Turnover 
 
This graph shows the marginal effect on the Hazard Rate of an increase in 
Experience at three levels of Turnover: mean, and plus/minus one standard error. An 
increase of a standard deviation in the Experience of the syndicate (that is, 37 
additional IPOs), increases the hazard of an IPO or an acquisition by: a) 133% if 
Turnover is one standard deviation below the mean; b) 118% if Turnover is at the 
mean; c) 103% if Turnover is at the mean plus one standard deviation 
 
 
  The results are not only significant, but economically meaningful as well. Figure 
2-1 shows how the effect of Experience on the hazard of an IPO or an acquisition varies 
across different levels of Turnover. An increase in the Experience variable equivalent to 
one standard deviation (i.e. 37 IPOs) more than triples the hazard of the venture going 
public or being acquired. However, this effect varies across different levels of Turnover: 
the hazard of an IPO or acquisition increases by 103% when Turnover is high (one 
standard deviation above the mean); the same effect is 133% when Turnover is low (one 
standard deviation above the mean). 
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 Figure 2-2 presents the same information for the interaction of Experience with 
the Expropriation Hazard. The difference across expropriation environments is greater  
than in the previous figure. An increase in one standard deviation in the Experience 
variables (i.e. 37 IPOs), increases the hazard of an IPO or an acquisition by 62% if the is 
a low Expropriation Hazard (one standard deviation below the mean). The increase in the 
hazard is roughly half (34%) when the Expropriation Hazard is high (one standard 
deviation above the mean).  
 
Figure 2-2. Effect of Experience by Level of Expropriation Hazard 
 
This graph shows the marginal effect on the Hazard Rate of an increase in 
Experience at three levels of Expropriation Hazard: mean, and plus/minus one 
standard error. An increase of a standard deviation in the Experience of the syndicate 
(that is, 37 additional IPOs), increases the hazard of an IPO or an acquisition by: a) 
62% if Expropriation is one standard deviation below the mean; b) 48% if 
Expropriation is at the mean; c) 34% if Expropriation is at the mean plus one 
standard deviation. 
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 The effects of controls are very robust among specifications. As expected, a 
venture with a higher stock of patents — effective signals of its quality — has a higher 
likelihood of going public or being acquired. Ventures whose main activity is BioPharma 
have also higher propensities to go public or be acquired. Against the expectations, GDP 
is not significant. The correlations in Table 2 show that GDP is positively correlated with 
the occurrence of a LiquidityEvent and negatively correlated with the Duration of the 
venture. However, these correlations are moderately small (4% and -10%, respectively), 
so the power of the test may not be sufficient to find an effect. 
 Different sensitivity analyses were conducted to ensure the robustness of the 
results. In the first stage I included more interactions between the joining investors and 
the current investors, which did not alter the final results. In addition, I conducted all 
analyses excluding the ventures founded in the United States to address potential 
concerns with the sampling methodology, finding the same qualitative results. I also 
considered different operationalizations of the Experience variable. I aggregated the 
experience across members of the syndicate in different ways; in particular, using the 
maximum experience instead of the total yields mostly consistent results, with a loss of 
significance in hypothesis 2-3. When I operationalized Experience as the number of IPOs 
in the biotechnology industry, instead of considering all industries, results were generally 
stronger, which supports the fact that industry experience is very relevant (Gompers, 
Kovner, Lerner, & Scharfstein, 2008). Finally, I included as a control the experience 
measured as the number of previous investments, regardless of whether there was an IPO. 
This variable was consistently not significant across specifications, even when the 
51 
Experience variable was not included, suggesting that it is not the size of the investor that 
matters, but its valuable resources.  
Discussion and Conclusion 
 Even though the expertise, resources, and networks of contacts of investors can 
add value to a venture (Hsu, 2006; Stuart et al., 1999), investors must have the right 
incentives to share their resources with the venture. I argued that these incentives are 
greater in the early stages of the venture, when there is a greater dependency on the 
investor; results showed that the effect of investors’ expertise on the performance of a 
venture is attenuated in the second and subsequent rounds. The incentives of investors to 
share their resources should also vary with the institutional environment. I found that 
when financial institutions are less developed the effect of investors’ expertise on a 
venture’s performance is enhanced, and that when political institutions make the hazard 
of expropriation higher, the effect of investors’ expertise is attenuated, indicating that 
there are fewer incentives to share their resources with the venture. 
 The finding that investors’ experience enhances the performance of their portfolio 
ventures is consistent with the broader literature, which analyzes how organizations learn 
from experience and accumulate resources capable of conferring upon them a 
competitive advantage (Argote, 1999; Dierickx & Cool, 1989). It is more surprising that 
only successful experience has a greater effect on performance, and not general 
cumulative experience. Although there may be learning from failure, some investors’ 
resources, such as their reputation or their networks of contacts, are built more 
consistently from successes than from failures.  
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 The core argument that investors’ resources increase the performance of startups 
is grounded in the resource-dependence perspective. Previous empirical tests of this 
theory have focused on firms subject to great uncertainty, such as those near bankruptcy 
(Daily & Dalton, 1994a, 1994b; Gales & Kesner, 1994) or young public firms (Kor & 
Misangyi, 2008; Kroll et al., 2007). This chapter adds to that literature by analyzing both 
public and private firms since the time of inception, and how the impact of investors on 
performance varies as the resource-dependencies of the venture evolve. The findings 
imply that when there is a lesser dependency on the environment, investors have fewer 
incentives to share their resources. This chapter also adds to empirical tests of resource-
dependence by providing another measure for the resources of investors. While previous 
literature has focused on the effect of different board compositions, such as the 
proportion of outside directors or the number of interlocks, as a proxy for the top 
management team’s exposure to external resources (Daily & Dalton, 1994a; Pfeffer, 
1972), this chapter has considered the experience of investors as antecedent to the know-
how, resources, and networks of contacts. 
 The argument that investors have to share their resources to add value to the 
invested firm is grounded on the alliance literature, which has analyzed how firms within 
a network have to collaborate in order to create value from the relationship (Dyer & 
Singh, 1998; Kale, Dyer, & Singh, 2002). Previous literature proposes a distinction 
between shared and non-shared resources, arguing that the nature of the relationship is as 
important as the nature of the resources (Lavie, 2006). This chapter empirically tests the 
idea that across different contexts, the nature of the relationship between two 
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organizations — in this case, investors and ventures — varies, and so does value creation 
within the partnership. 
 Finally, in this chapter I have sought to explain how the effect of investors’ 
resources varies with changes in the institutional environment. International business 
scholars have found that the optimal strategy may vary with the context; for instance, 
related diversification is considered best practice in western countries, but conglomerates 
provide an advantage in the absence of strong institutional environments (Guillen, 2000; 
Khanna & Palepu, 1997). The findings in this chapter suggest that the incentives of 
investors to share their resources vary with the development of stock markets and the 
stability of political institutions, which implies that the strategic choice to share the 
resources also varies with the institutional environment. 
 These results have implications for both investors and startups. An investor faces 
a choice between having more firms in the portfolio that compete for attention and 
resources, and having a smaller portfolio to which the investor can add more value. This 
chapter suggests that the optimal amount of attention and resources provided to each firm 
in the portfolio may vary with the stage of development, the development of the financial 
institutions, and the stability of the political institutions. The managers of startups have to 
decide whom to seek funding from and, in case of receiving more than one offer which 
one to select. Hsu (2004) shows that startups are willing to accept a lower valuation from 
a more reputed investor, with the hope that such an investor will add value to their firm. 
The findings in this chapter suggest that, in doing so, the managers of startups should 
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consider not just the reputation, but also the incentives investors will have to effectively 
share their resources.  
 This study is not without limitations. There are concerns with the generalizability 
of the results to industries other than biotechnology, whose peculiarities include a long 
maturity cycle, a greater environmental uncertainty, and a great need for funding, which 
may affect the degree to which a firm depends on external resources. Results should be 
more generalizable to other high-technology industries, which share some of these same 
features. Another concern is whether the results can be generalized to investors other than 
venture capital firms. Although VC firms are usually considered unique, other investors 
fulfill a very similar role. For instance, many research institutions provide consultancy 
services to startups that are similar to those offered by venture capital firms; corporate 
venture capital programs are very similar in nature, as well. To the extent that other 
investors have similar business models and resources, the results in the chapter can be 
generalized. Nevertheless, it is important to be cautious, because the objectives of 
research institutions or corporate venture capital firms may differ from those of venture 
capitalists (Dushnitsky & Lenox, 2005) in ways that affect, among others, the definition 
of performance.  
Finally, the matching between investors and ventures is such that we may observe 
more pairings between experienced investors and promising firms that we would expect 
randomly. In this chapter I have controlled for this self-selection by estimating the 
probability of a matching in the first stage, and controlling for this probability in the 
second stage. However, with a Cox regression model in the second stage this technique 
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provides only an approximation to the matching problem, as discussed in the methods 
section. Nevertheless, the results are consistent with previous research on the separation 
of the matching process from the ulterior performance effect, which finds evidence of 
both processes (Baum & Silverman, 2004; Fitza et al., 2009). 
 This chapter has sought to unveil some of the processes by which investors 
provide ventures with their resources, and how those processes are moderated by the 
context. Although this is not the first study to analyze the process and context in the 
investor-venture relationship, most previous research has focused on the content. The link 
between investors’ resources and firm performance depends on the type of resources and 
the type of investors, but it also depends on how investors decide to share their resources 
and the contextual factors that moderate both the investors’ strategy and the effectiveness 
of investors’ resources. Further research is needed to better understand the 
interrelationships among content, process, and context. 
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3. Investors’ Experience and Innovative Outcomes 
Introduction 
 Venture capital investments are usually associated with innovative firms, and 
many countries have fostered their development with the hope to foster their innovation 
output. Naturally, venture capital firms enhance the innovation of firms by providing the 
financial resources that are needed in the research and development process. The 
literature has also shown that venture capital firms tend to invest in those firms that are 
more innovative (Bottazzi & Da Rin, 2002). Nevertheless, besides picking the most 
promising firms and providing them with financial resources, investors act also as 
resource providers and enhance the performance of firms. It is yet an open question, 
however, whether investors can contribute to the research processes of high technology 
entrepreneurs above and beyond providing the financial resources.  
 The resource provision role of investors has been documented in the resource-
dependence empirical literature, showing that the networks of external directors are 
beneficial in cases of high uncertainty (Boyd, 1990; Daily & Dalton, 1994a, 1994b). The 
entrepreneurial finance literature has shown that investors influence entrepreneurial firm 
performance by fostering strategic product commercialization alliances (Hsu, 2006), or 
by professionalizing the top management team and human resource practices of the firm 
(Hellmann & Puri, 2002). While there is general agreement that investors can influence 
the financial performance of their portfolio firm, scarce attention has been paid to 
whether they can also influence their innovative outcomes. Kortum and Lerner (2000) 
57 
found that even after controlling for selection, venture capital investments have fostered 
innovation at an industry level in the United States in the 80’s. Yet, whether this effect 
would exist in different institutional environments is still an open question.  
 This chapter seeks to address this gap by analyzing how investors the innovative 
outcomes of firms across different institutional environments.  I start by analyzing the 
baseline effect of experienced investors on the innovative outcomes of firms, recognizing 
that the effect may differ for the commercial research and the basic science research. 
Innovation scholars have shown that applied and basic research have very complex 
dynamics, finding that patents and publications are at the same time complements, with 
the existence of patent-publication pairs (Huang & Murray, 2009), and substitutes, for the 
research effort is divided between the two research programs (Cockburn, Henderson, & 
Stern, 2002). In this chapter I analyze how investors influence both patents and 
publications, and suggest the mechanisms that may drive this effect.  
 While experienced investors may enhance both patents and publications, this 
impact may not be constant across different environments. Resource-dependence theory 
poses that in dealing with uncertainty firms enhance their performance when they secure 
access to critical external resources (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). The innovation processes 
of firms are naturally subject to both technological and market uncertainty, but also to a 
more regulatory and political risk, which may put incentives or obstacles to different 
streams of research. This is particularly salient in fields like biotechnology, whose ethical 
implications derive in regulatory and political tensions. In this chapter I will argue that 
experienced investors can have a greater impact on the innovative outcomes of firms 
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when there is higher political and regulatory risk. In particular, this moderation effect 
should be stronger for patents than for publications, since the former are subject to the 
regulatory environment at all times. The empirical setting of this dissertation is 
particularly well suited to answer these issues, since it provides institutional variation 
across thirty different countries along more than a decade, also allowing me to compare 
the impact of investors on both patents and publications. In this chapter the sample was 
restricted to the period of 1991 to 2002 to reduce the concerns with the patent lag. I find 
that having more experienced venture capital firms enhances the patent count and patent 
citations as well as the publications. The effect of experienced investors on the patents is 
stronger when there is greater political and regulatory risk, or in other words, when there 
is greater hazard of expropriation, indicating that the experience of investors is valuable 
in dealing with the uncertainty posed in these situations. This moderating effect does not 
hold for publications, which are less subject to the regulatory uncertainty of the local 
country.  
Theory and Hypotheses Development 
Investors and the Innovative Outcomes of Firms 
 Research has shown that investors such as venture capital firms enhance the 
innovative outcomes of firms (Kortum & Lerner, 2000), less attention has been paid to 
the mechanisms by which this happens. Past research has focused on two processes: 
access to capital, and selection of investments. Access to capital is indeed relevant for the 
R&D activities, which tend to be intensive in financial resources. In fact, venture capital 
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firms have specialized in high technology entrepreneurial firms that require large sums of 
money relative to the uncertainty that surrounds them (Gompers & Lerner, 2004; Gorman 
& Sahlman, 1989). Research has shown consistently that firms that are backed by a 
venture capital firm are associated with higher performance, and one of the major 
rationales for this is the access to capital. Nevertheless, there is also evidence of 
persistence of returns of certain investors (Kaplan & Schoar, 2005), which indicates that 
while financial capital is an asset, there are other knowledge-based resources that are 
critical for the firms they invest in. In particular, I showed in the previous chapter that 
venture capital firms with more experience tend to provide similar amounts of money, but 
they also provide additional resources that have an impact on the firm’s outcomes.  
The second mechanism discussed in previous literature is selection of investments. 
Naturally, the selection is not random and venture capital firms and other investors have 
developed capabilities to screen and select the most promising ventures (Amit et al., 
1991; Baum & Silverman, 2004; Gompers, 1995). Nevertheless, research suggests that 
even after accounting for this selection mechanisms, venture capital firms had an 
influence of the innovative outcomes of firms (Kortum & Lerner, 2000). In this chapter I 
propose two complementary mechanisms that may drive this effect. 
 First, investors may also foster the innovative outcomes of firms by increasing the 
general efficiency of the firm, freeing resources and attention that can be focused on the 
innovative outcomes. High technology entrepreneurial firms are often founded by 
scientists that have little managerial experience; as a result, some of the decisions made 
in the firm are not very efficient, take time, and diminish the span of attention that can be 
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paid to the discovery process. For instance, a venture capitalist explained in an interview 
that one of the most relevant contributions to their portfolio firms was the selection of a 
competent CFO that knew how to manage the complex cash flows of a biotech firm.14
 Second, investors influence the technological trajectory of the firm. While the 
high technology firm is an expert in its area of expertise, investors have a better 
knowledge of the landscape of different innovations. Note that venture capitalists receive 
hundreds of business plans per year, and they thrive in a difficult business, learning to 
identify which opportunities have more commercial application. As such, once they 
invest in a firm, they usually provide some direction in terms of what lines of research 
have greater potential. In an interview, the founder and CEO of a biotechnology firm 
acknowledged that the most helpful advice they had received from their investors was 
precisely what research lines to follow and which ones not to.
 
Overall, shifting attention from management problems to scientific problems should 
increase the research productivity. 
15
Therefore, all these mechanisms complement each other and suggest that 
experienced investors enhance the innovative outcomes of firms. While I cannot 
disentangle the processes empirically, I propose a positive effect of investors’ experience 
on the innovative outcomes of firms. 
 Focusing the 
technological trajectory on more commercial applications makes filing the patent more 
attractive to the firm, and as a result increases the innovative outputs.  
                                                 
14 Interview with a venture capitalist, Philadelphia (PA), April 2008. 
15 Interview with the founder and CEO of a Spanish biotech firm, Madrid, December 2006. 
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Hypothesis 3-1. The number of innovative outcomes of a firm increases with the 
experience of the venture capital firms in the investment syndicate.  
 Even though the four aforementioned mechanisms (i.e. access to capital, 
selection, increased efficiency, or focused technological trajectory) may all foster the 
innovative outcomes of a firm, they may have a different effect depending on the type of 
innovative outcome. Research has studied the trade-offs between applied and basic 
science, finding that patents and publications are substitutes and at the same time 
complements to some degree. In certain occasions basic and applied science complement 
each other and leading to patent-publication pairs that are based on the same discovery 
(Huang & Murray, 2009). However, they are substitutes to some extent, because some 
basic science does not directly lead to a commercial application, and they both compete 
for the resources devoted to research (Cockburn et al., 2002). Since applied science can 
be monetized, investors may have incentives to foster patents in detriment of the 
publications at times, and we may observe different effects. Even though it is not the 
focus of this chapter to analyze the trade-offs between these two innovative outcomes, I 
will analyze the effects separately in the results section to establish the baseline.  
Regulatory Uncertainty as a Moderator of Experience 
 Even though experienced investors foster both the applied science and basic 
science outcomes of firms, this effect is not independent of the institutional environment 
in which the firm thrives. Resource-dependence theory predicts that in situations of 
uncertainty firms depend more on external resources that are controlled by few firms, and 
securing access to those resources enhances performance (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). 
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Therefore, one would expect that investors may have a more relevant resource provision 
role in environments that are more uncertain.  
 High technology firms are subject to different sources of uncertainty. The 
literature has discussed the technological and market uncertainty derived from the 
discovery process and whether the innovation will have a commercial application. 
Besides these two types of uncertainty, which are technology/product specific, the 
institutional environment of the country presents “institutional uncertainty” as well which 
greatly affects the operations of a firm. In particular, the regulation of intellectual 
property rights has received much attention from research studies, which have analyzed 
how firms locate depending on the levels of IP protection (Zhao, 2006). In particular, 
when there is more political and regulatory uncertainty, firms tend to reduce the 
investment in intangible resources, such as innovation. However, firms that know how to 
manage that uncertainty sometimes choose to invest more in intangibles and extract then 
rents (Henisz, 2000).  
  For high technology entrepreneurs that face an increased political or regulatory 
hazard, having access to the experience of investors in dealing with these situations may 
be critical to allow them to continue their investment in innovation. Hence, I expect:  
Hypothesis 3-2. The effect of the experience of the venture capital firms on the 
innovative outcomes of a firm is greater when the firm faces increased political and 
regulatory hazard.  
 Nevertheless, not all innovative outcomes are equally affected by the regulatory 
hazards of a country. While patents are highly regulated and usually take a long period of 
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time to be granted, publications are only constrained by the regulations of intellectual 
property protection regarding the accompanying patent. Hence, the uncertainty posed by 
changes of the regulatory environment is much less. Therefore, I expect the previous 
hypotheses to hold only for applied science outcomes and not necessarily for basic 
science.  
Methodology 
Research Setting and Sample 
 I test the hypotheses in an international sample of biotechnology ventures. Being 
high technology firms they have a focus on innovation, and there is a measurable output 
for the innovation process (Darby & Zucker, 2002). Having an international sample 
provides variation across different institutional environments to test how the effects 
change across countries. Finally, entrepreneurial firms are subject to uncertainty, and as a 
result investors may have more incentives to provide resources other than monetary to 
increase the chances of success of the firm. 
The departing point for data collection was the VentureXpert’s SDC Platinum 
Database. This database comprises the investment history of firms that receive funding 
from venture capital firms, financial institutions, institutional investors, government 
sponsored institutions or strategic partners, and it is the investment database with greater 
international coverage. It has been widely used in both the entrepreneurship (Megginson 
& Weiss, 1991; Sahlman, 1990; Shane & Stuart, 2002) and the multinational literatures 
(Guler & Guillen, 2010a; Guler & McGahan, 2006, 2007). To complement the data 
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provided in VentureXpert, I built the history of each of the firms in the sample using the 
company website (when available) and Factiva Dow Jones; this allowed me to keep track 
of all the name changes of the firm, as well as to ascertain if and when the firm was 
acquired or merged, went public, or went bankrupt.  
To collect the innovative outcomes of these firms, I gathered publications using 
ISI Web of Knowledge and patents using the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office website. 
In an interview, a patent lawyer explained that using only U.S. patents is not restrictive in 
the case of biotechnology firms, because they need to patent in a variety of countries 
simultaneously to ensure the protection of their invention.16
 The sample consists of 631 biotechnology entrepreneurs founded between 1991 
and 2002 in 30 different countries, with a total of 2,354 venture-years (i.e. unit of 
analysis). I collected all the biotechnology entrepreneurs from outside the U.S. and a 10% 
random sample of the American firms. While ideally one would want to have all the U.S. 
firms, the process of obtaining all the data was time consuming and I chose to maximize 
the institutional variation (i.e. the country variation) for theoretical reasons. Firms were 
followed until they go bankrupt, until they are acquired, until they go public –since at this 
point they are not regarded as entrepreneurial firms; or until 2002.
 In a research study, Graham 
et al (2002) found that U.S. patents tend to find less opposition than in Europe, and so it 
is a less restrictive measure.  
17
                                                 
16 Interview with a patent lawyer, Philadelphia (PA), September 2007. 
 As a result, the 
sample is entrepreneurial by nature, as these are high-technology, private ventures, with 
17 The window of observation is 2005, but I restrict the analysis to 2002 to ensure the observability of the 
patents, as explained below. 
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an average age of 3 years, and with most of the mass between 0 and 6 years of existence, 
within the usual criteria (Autio et al., 2000).  
Although it would be appealing to study the variation across different types of 
investors, they differ greatly in their degree of involvement, the type of resources shared, 
and the time allocated to each investment. To avoid this noise, I choose to focus on 
venture capital firms, building on a vast literature that documents how they tend to share 
their expertise, resources, and networks with their portfolio firms (Gompers & Lerner, 
2004; Gorman & Sahlman, 1989). To gain a better understanding of the processes 
underlying the motivations of venture capitalists, I conducted informal interviews with 
venture capital firms and biotechnology firms.  
Dependent Variables 
The four dependent variables in the study are publications, patents, patent 
forward citations, and patent non-self citations. The Publications of the firm were hand 
collected from the ISI Web of Knowledge, identifying those publications whose authors 
were affiliated to the biotechnology firm. To ensure the consistency in the coding, the 
whole process was done by one research assistant, and a 5% random sample was 
rechecked by a second research assistant. While the results of both coding outputs were 
remarkably similar (99% coincidence), there were some inconsistencies in companies 
with more than 50 publications, so I coded these again to ensure accuracy. 
The variables Patents, ForwardCitations and Non-Self-Citations were obtained 
from the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. These were hand collected to ensure that the 
assignee is the same firm that is included in the sample (i.e. by checking the address, as 
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well as the identity of the inventors when necessary). In consonance with the patent 
literature, I considered only those patents that were granted, using the application date. 
Since all patents were re-collected in early 2009, this greatly reduces the concern of the 
patent grant lag and ensures that most patents were observed. In unreported analyses, I 
studied the lag between filing and publication dates in my sample, finding that the vast 
majority of patents had a lag inferior to six years. Therefore, I restrict the window of 
observation of the analysis to the period 1990 to 2002, thereby reducing the concerns 
related to the lag. 
Note that because some of the firms were acquired, the patent reassignment rule 
poses a concern on the observability of the firm’s patents. By regulation 35 U.S.C. 261, 
patent applications and patents may be reassigned to the new owners in case of an 
acquisition. Hence, for the 66 firms that were acquired in my sample there is a concern 
with the observability of the patent measures. In robustness analyses I excluded all the 
firms that are acquired, finding similar qualitative and quantitative results.  
 The Patentsit variable measures the flow of (granted) patents of the 
biotechnology firm i filed in time t, regardless of the technology class.18
                                                 
18 Since biotechnology is an interdisciplinary field, I did not restrict to patents within the biotechnology 
class, since patents in other areas are also indicative of the innovative activities of the firm.  
 The patents are 
assigned to firm i when it appears in the Assignee field of the patent, and while most of 
them are dated after the founding of the firm, there are some patents that date prior to the 
founding. Robustness analyses were done excluding these patents. Some of the patents 
were filed using the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT), and so for these the date of filing 
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in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office may be posterior to the initial filing date. In 
these cases, I chose the date of first filing (i.e. PCT filing date).  
The ForwardCitationsit variable measures the flow of patents filed in time t that 
cite any of the patents of firm i. This measure is generally preferred to the count of 
patents, since it is considered more related to the real innovative outcomes and less 
subject to variations for legal and strategic issues (e.g. Cockburn et al., 2002). The 
measure NonSelfCitationsit is a variation of the previous measure, which excludes all 
forward citations such that the focal firm is the (or one of the) assignees of the patent.  
Finally, the Publicationsit variable is operationalized as the flow of publications 
of firm i in time t. Likewise patents, some of the publications pre-date the incorporation 
date; sensitivity analyses were conducted excluding these publications 
Analyses 
 Since the dependent variables only take positive integer values, it is recommended 
to use a count model. The simplest alternative is to use a Poisson or a negative binomial, 
which is a transformation of the Poisson model that relaxes the assumption of having a 
mean equal to the standard deviation. Unfortunately, when introducing firm fixed effects 
the estimation is not robust and it is not recommended (Allison, 2005; Wooldridge, 
1997). Instead, I used the Poisson quasi-maximum likelihood estimator, which unlike the 
Poisson maximum likelihood estimator, does not assume that the distribution has a 
variance equal to the mean, and is robust when using firm fixed effects. To implement 
this in Stata I use the xtqmlp command, originally developed by Tim Simcoe ( available 
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for download at http://pazoulay.scripts.mit.edu/Software.html) (Cameron & Trivedi, 
2009). 
 Using firm fixed effects partially reduces the concerns of endogenous matching 
between investors with experience and promising biotech entrepreneurs. Research has 
shown that there is a non-random matching between investors and entrepreneurs (Hsu, 
2004; Sørensen, 2007); the dynamics of such matching, however, are complex, and while 
the general concern is that the best entrepreneurs are matched with the best investors, this 
need not be the case (Amit et al., 1991). To the extent that the matching is based on a 
fixed characteristic of the firm, for instance, characteristics of the founding team, country 
where the venture is located, or whether the firm is a spin-off, then firm fixed effects 
address the endogenous matching. Nevertheless, one could argue that at some point in 
time very seasoned investors may anticipate a change in direction in the firm’s innovative 
outcomes, and then invest in the firm to reap the benefits. For instance, a biotech 
entrepreneur that just hired a star scientist is likely to increase the number of patents in 
the future, and while the investor can observe this, it may remain an unobserved factor 
for the researcher. As a result, causality has to be argued with caution in this respect and 
it will be discussed below for each of the hypotheses the direction of both the predicted 
and the selection mechanisms in order to draw conclusions.   
Independent Variables 
 The core thesis of the chapter refers to the effect of investor experience on the 
innovative outcomes of firms. For each biotech year, I measured ExperienceVCi,t-1 as the 
Investor characteristics 
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total number of IPOs the venture capital firms in the syndicate have experienced in the 
past (up to t-1); for parsimony, I operationalize the experience regardless of the industry. 
Because this is the measure used in other chapters in this dissertation, it facilitates the 
comparison of the results. In robustness analyses I find similar qualitative results when 
measuring the experience as the number of past investments, instead of just those that 
went public, and when restricting the experience to only biotechnology firms.  
 Besides the experience I included other variables that describe the syndicate of 
investors, such as: a) Round of investment i,t-1, which takes values 0, 1, 2… indicating the 
number of round of investment; b) VCi,t-1, an indicator of whether there is a venture 
capital firm in the syndicate; c) Financial Institution i,t-1, an indicator of whether there is a 
financial institution in the syndicate; and d) CVC i,t-1, an indicator of whether there is a 
corporate venture capital firm in the syndicate. 
 PatentStock i,t-1 measures the number of patents assigned to firm i up to t-1. As in 
the dependent variable, I used the filing date (and the PCT filing date when available), 
but instead of the flow this variable measures the stock. In robustness analyses I broke 
this variable into the flow of patents in t-1 (i.e. lagged dependent variable) and the stock 
up to t-2, with similar results.  
Stock of innovative outcomes and other firm variables 
 PublicationStock i,t-1 measures the number of publications of authors affiliated to 
firm i, with publication date up to t-1. Results are robust to using the flow of publications 
in t-1 (i.e. lagged dependent variable) and the stock of publications up to t-2.  
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 Finally, I also included the Firm’s Age i,t-1 of the firm since the date of 
incorporation as well as the square term (Firm’s Age squared i,t-1), since the number of 
patents, publications and citations may increase with age, but at a decreasing rate. For 
those patents and publications filed/published before the date of incorporation, the age is 
zero. In robustness analyses, I excluded all the observations prior to founding, with 
similar qualitative and quantitative results, as described in the results section. 
 I measure the hazard of expropriation using the political constraints index 
(Polcon) developed by Henisz (2002), which estimates the feasibility of a policy change 
by taking into account the checks and balances among political actors. I define the 
variable Expropriation Hazardit as the Polcon index with reversed sign, for consistency 
with the previous chapter. 
Biotech’s country of origin characteristics 
To account for the cross-country institutional variation, I build on Guler and 
Guillen (2010b) and control for the level of economic development, as the GDP per 
capita (PPP), and for the stock exchange market capitalization, as percentage of the GDP, 
and the stock exchange turnover, all from the World Bank.  
Results 
 Table 3-1 shows the distribution by country of the whole sample and sub-samples 
used in the analyses. The original sample spans a total of 30 countries, with Germany, 
U.S., U.K., Canada, Korea and France being the more frequent, consistent with the 
distribution from the industry. Because all the analyses in this chapter are fixed effects 
models, they only use in the estimation those firms for which there is within-firm 
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variation. While this is always the case in fixed effects models, it is useful to understand 
how the subsamples of firms that vary differ from the original sample. The remaining 
four columns of table 3-1 show the number of venture-years per country finally used in 
the estimation of the patents, publications, patent citations, and patent non-self citations 
models. Note that while the original sample has 30 countries, the final estimation 
comprises 23 countries for patents, 21 for publications, 18 for patent citations and 17 for 
non self citations. While this is a very reasonable number of countries for an international 
sample, it restricts the range of institutional variation, making the moderating effect of 
institutional variation variables (such as Expropriation Hazard) more difficult to observe, 
for which this is a more conservative test.  
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Table 3-1. Dependent Variables, Distribution by Country 
Sample:a Whole Patents Publications Citations 
Non Self 
Citations 
Country N N N N N 
Australia  69 35 23 20 11 
Austria  12 4 4 0 0 
Belgium  23 10 15 10 10 
Brazil  18 0 0 0 0 
Canada  160 105 87 82 69 
China  9 0 0 0 0 
Denmark  48 20 24 17 17 
Finland  67 49 39 16 9 
France  172 80 102 54 54 
Germany 503 208 311 100 100 
Hungary  10 10 10 10 10 
India  44 6 9 0 0 
Ireland  24 9 11 2 2 
Israel  85 58 43 28 28 
Italy  2 0 0 0 0 
Japan  20 14 6 0 0 
Korea  177 46 80 19 19 
Malaysia  1 0 0 0 0 
Netherlands  26 12 22 8 8 
New Zealand  10 10 0 10 0 
Norway  40 23 20 12 7 
Portugal  6 6 0 0 0 
Singapore  1 0 0 0 0 
South Africa  3 0 0 0 0 
Spain  14 0 6 0 0 
Sweden  82 65 42 61 52 
Switzerland  40 31 31 15 9 
Turkey  3 0 0 0 0 
U.K.  225 119 130 82 59 
U.S.A.b 239 167 168 132 125 
Total 2,133 1,087 1,183 678 589 
a The patents, publications, citations, and non self citations samples include those firms 
included in the within firm estimation, i.e. those firms for which there is variation in the 
corresponding dependent variable.  
b Note that for the U.S. I have a random sample of 10% of the biotech firms, while I collected 
the population (as per VentureXpert) for all the other countries. 
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Table 3-2 shows the descriptive statistics for the variables in the sample, as well 
as the descriptive statistics for the patents, patent citations and publications subsamples. It 
is worth noting that on average the whole experience of the VC firms in the syndicate 
amounts to 134 previous investments, but the right tail of the distribution is more than 
4,000 deals. Robustness analyses were conducted to ensure the results were not driven by 
this right tail. Regarding the innovative outcomes, firms in the sample have on average 
1.26 patents, 0.5 citations and 2.8 publications. The sample is entrepreneurial by nature, 
being observed since founding until six years, on average. When analyzing differences of 
the citations and publications sub-samples it is important to note that these firms tend to 
have investors with greater experience, and they tend to have more patents, publications 
and citations. Naturally, those that don’t have patents, publications or citations don’t 
experience change in the dependent variable and tend to be less attractive to investors. 
Table 3-3 shows the correlation for the whole sample. Consistent with previous 
literature, the correlation between publications and patents is positive and significant. 
However, while the stock of publications and the stock of patents have a positive 
correlation, this is much lower (0.10). This is consistent with the dual nature of patents 
and publication as complements but also as substitutes (Cockburn et al., 2002; Huang & 
Murray, 2009). As expected, citations and patents are correlated. Finally, the correlations 
between the experience variables and the interactions of experience and expropriation 
hazard are high; in robustness analyses I centered the variables, finding similar results.  
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Table 3-2. Descriptive Statistics 
Sample:a Whole Patents Publications Citations 
Variables avg s.e. avg s.e. avg s.e. avg s.e. 
Patents i,t-1 0.46 1.24 0.89 1.61 0.64 1.52 1.10 1.90 
Publications i,t-1 1.06 3.09 1.39 3.39 1.86 3.92 1.43 3.67 
Citations i,t-1 0.83 4.16 1.58 5.69 1.10 3.99 2.58 7.02 
Non Self Citations i,t-1 0.65 3.76 1.23 5.16 0.83 3.36 2.03 6.41 
ExperienceVCi,t-1b 0.10 0.35 0.15 0.43 0.15 0.43 0.17 0.47 
Experience VCi,t-1  
  * Turnover i,t-1 b,c 0.45 1.64 0.70 2.02 0.69 2.05 0.76 2.26 
Experience VCi,t-1  b 
  * Expropriationi,t-1b -0.04 0.14 -0.06 0.18 -0.06 0.18 -0.07 0.19 
PatentStock i,t-1 1.26 3.00 2.28 3.88 1.74 3.73 3.19 4.56 
PublicationStock i,t-1b 0.03 0.16 0.03 0.17 0.05 0.21 0.04 0.22 
Firm’s Age i,t-1 3.24 2.47 3.62 2.54 3.43 2.43 3.75 2.64 
Firm’s Age squared i,t-1 16.60 24.50 19.57 25.59 17.63 23.76 21.01 26.46 
Round of investment i,t-1 0.73 1.04 0.94 1.26 0.94 1.17 1.02 1.40 
VCi,t-1 0.37 0.48 0.43 0.50 0.47 0.50 0.44 0.50 
Financial Institution i,t-1 0.15 0.35 0.18 0.38 0.17 0.37 0.17 0.37 
CVC i,t-1 0.02 0.15 0.03 0.17 0.03 0.17 0.04 0.19 
GDP i,t-1 28.12 7.26 29.29 5.85 29.22 5.97 29.85 5.49 
StockMarketCap i,t-1 c 4.33 0.65 4.44 0.64 4.39 0.64 4.49 0.62 
Turnover i,t-1c 4.47 0.59 4.40 0.54 4.50 0.57 4.39 0.52 
Expropriation i,t-1 -0.45 0.08 -0.45 0.07 -0.45 0.07 -0.45 0.08 
N (venture years) 2,255  1,161  1,266  726  
N (number of firms) 607  246  287  143  
a Fixed effects models (within estimation) only use firms for which the dependent variable 
changes. This table presents the descriptive statistics for the whole sample, and for the sub-
samples used in the estimation of the patents, publications, and citations regressions.  
b Experience VC and PublicationStock measures are divided by 100 for table readability; hence, 
the unit is 100 IPOs and a 100 publications respectively. 
c Logarithmic transformation of Stock Market Capitalization and Turnover (plus 1, since the 
minimum value is zero) throughout tables. 
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Table 3-3. Correlations 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. Patents i,t-1          
2. Publications i,t-1 .29         
3. Citations i,t-1 .41 .14        
4. Non Self Citations i,t-1 .32 .13 .97       
5. ExperienceVCi,t-1b .31 .29 .19 .18      
6. 
Experience VCi,t-1  
  * Turnover i,t-1 b,c .30 .28 .19 .18 .99     
7. 
Experience VCi,t-1  b 
  * Expropriationi,t-1b -.3 -.29 -.19 -.17 -.99 -.98    
8. PatentStock i,t-1 .5 .22 .57 .52 .27 .27 -.28   
9. PublicationStock i,t-1b .13 .70 .06 .06 .08 .08 -.08 .10  
10. Firm’s Age i,t-1 .08 .06 .16 .15 .14 .14 -.14 .30 .04 
11. Firm’s Age squared i,t-1 .04 .03 .13 .13 .10 .10 -.10 .27 .04 
12. Round of investment i,t-1 .22 .23 .25 .23 .54 .54 -.54 .39 .10 
13. VCi,t-1 .14 .21 .16 .14 .37 .36 -.37 .23 .12 
14. Financial Institution i,t-1 .09 .09 .12 .11 .15 .15 -.16 .17 .02 
15. CVC i,t-1 .05 .05 .07 .06 .07 .06 -.09 .11 .01 
16. GDP i,t-1 .10 .03 .12 .11 .19 .20 -.19 .16 -.07 
17. StockMarketCap i,t-1 c .11 .01 .11 .09 .16 .17 -.15 .17 -.06 
18. Turnover i,t-1c -.05 -.05 .02 .02 .05 .08 -.04 -.02 -.07 
19. Expropriation i,t-1 .05 .06 .03 .02 .13 .13 -.08 .06 .05 
  10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
10. Firm’s Age i,t-1          
11. Firm’s Age squared i,t-1 .95         
12. Round of investment i,t-1 .34 .26        
13. VCi,t-1 .24 .17 .67       
14. Financial Institution i,t-1 .15 .10 .42 .25      
15. CVC i,t-1 .08 .07 .18 .15 .11     
16. GDP i,t-1 .05 .03 .25 .21 .07 .07    
17. StockMarketCap i,t-1 c .06 .05 .20 .14 .06 .05 .51   
18. Turnover i,t-1c .02 .02 .16 .12 .02 -.04 .08 -.10  
19. Expropriation i,t-1 .02 .01 .13 .09 -.02 -.05 .05 .17 .28 
a N (venture-years) = 2,133, number of firms = 607. All correlations larger than 0.04 are 
significant at p < 0.05. 
b Experience VC and PublicationStock measures are divided by 100 for table readability; 
hence, the unit is 100 IPOs and a 100 publications respectively. 
c Logarithmic transformation of Stock Market Capitalization and Turnover (plus 1, since 
the minimum value is zero) throughout tables. 
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The results from the Poisson quasi-likelihood regressions are shown in table 3-4. 
For each of the four dependent variables, patents, publications, patent forward citations, 
and patent non-self citations, I estimate the effect of the ExperienceVC variable, and the 
interaction with the Expropriation Hazard variable. Additionally I estimate a full model 
that includes the interaction with the Turnover variable, so that the results can be 
compared throughout the chapters of the dissertation.  
Interestingly, the stock of patents in year t-1 (PatentStocki,t-1) reduces the count of 
patents, and the stock of publications (PublicationStocki,t-1) reduces the flow of 
publications. Using different lags of this variable I found the same effect. This negative 
effect may be just the result of cycles in the research and development within the firm. 
Since these are relatively young and small biotechnology firms, applying for a patent is a 
major milestone, and there may be on average some lag until the firm is prepared to apply 
for the following. However, more research may be needed to understand these dynamics. 
It is also worth noting that the publication stock increases the count of patents of a firm, 
which suggests that basic science and applied science may act as complements. Since 
publications are basic science they are less affected by prior applied knowledge, and so I 
find no effect of the stock of patents on the count of publications. These two results may 
indicate the presence of patent-publication pairs. In fact, a closer look at a small sample 
of the firms in my sample revealed the existence of some pairs, although for a great 
proportion of the patents there was not a clear match between patents and publications. In 
unreported regressions I controlled for the interaction between the patent stock and the 
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publication stock; while the main results did not change, this interaction was significant 
for some models. 
The first hypothesis of this chapter is that the Experience of the VC enhances the 
innovative outcomes of the firm. I test this in the first model for each of the dependent 
variables (I), finding that the effect is positive and significant for Publications, Patent 
Citations and NonSelfCitations. However, the effect was not significant for Patents. One 
possible explanation may be the nature of the variable, which increases not just due to 
innovation but also when the firm builds a patent thicket. Because of this reason, patent 
forward citations are usually considered a better measure of the innovative processes of 
the firm. The second hypothesis postulates that the effect of the experience of the 
investors will be accentuated when the hazard of Expropriation increases. Models II test 
this effect, finding support for the hypotheses for patents, patent citations and non-self-
citations. As expected, the effect is not significant for publications, which are generally 
less affected by the regulatory regime. Note that while the main effect of Expropriation 
Hazard is positive and significant (for the citations and non-self citations models), this 
main effect is reduced and not significant when the interaction is controlled for. Note that 
this is within-firm estimation, and so the lack of the main effect simply implies that the 
changes in the Expropriation Hazard of the local country across time does not directly 
affect the outcome, but rather moderate the impact of investor experience.  
Finally, and as a comparison to the results of the previous chapter, I test the 
interaction of the experience of the investors with the stock exchange Turnover. Overall, 
the main effect of Experience loses strength and significance in this model, but the 
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interaction with the Expropriation Hazard is more robust. The interaction with Turnover 
is positive and significant for the citations and non-self citations models. Nevertheless, 
the correlation among these two interactions is extremely high; centering the variables 
did not improve the collinearity problem. 
The results are generally robust to different specifications. Because of the 
multicollinearity problem with some of the variables, I repeated the analyses centering 
the Expropriation and Turnover variables, with the same qualitative results. Other 
robustness analyses included different specifications of the patents and publications stock 
measures, with different lags, which did not alter the main results. Measuring experience 
as the number of past deals instead of the number of IPOs did not change the findings of 
the paper either. To address the potential concerns with patent reassignments after an 
acquisition, I excluded all the firms that were acquired; while the results are generally the 
same, the significance level for the second hypothesis in the patents regression is only 
10%. Similarly, the strength of hypothesis 2 drops when I exclude the patents prior to the 
founding. Overall, this may indicate the presence of noise in the Patents variable. 
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Table 3-4. Results of the QMLE Poisson on Patents and Publications 
Dependent Variablea Patents Publications 
 (I) (II) (III) (I) (II) (III) 
ExperienceVCi,t-1b 0.36† 1.77* 1.53 0.51** -0.64 -0.54 
 (0.20) (0.74) (1.13) (0.18) (0.72) (1.15) 
Experience VCi,t-1  
  * Expropriationi,t-1b  3.39* 3.32†  -2.80† -2.76 
  (1.70) (1.73)  (1.62) (1.70) 
Experience VCi,t-1  b 
  * Turnover i,t-1 b,c   0.05   -0.02 
   (0.17)   (0.13) 
PatentStock i,t-1 -0.10*** -0.10*** -0.10*** 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
PublicationStock i,t-1b 4.08*** 4.06*** 4.04*** -1.78*** -1.78*** -1.78*** 
 (0.91) (0.91) (0.90) (0.32) (0.31) (0.31) 
Firm’s Age i,t-1 0.38*** 0.38*** 0.38*** 0.55*** 0.54*** 0.54*** 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) 
Firm’s Age squared i,t-1 -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.04*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Round of investment i,t-1 -0.21* -0.21* -0.21* -0.08 -0.09 -0.09 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) 
VCi,t-1 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.04 0.06 0.06 
 (0.15) (0.15) (0.14) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) 
Financial Institution i,t-1 0.48** 0.50** 0.50** -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 
 (0.16) (0.15) (0.15) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) 
CVC i,t-1 -0.01 0.04 0.05 0.01 -0.06 -0.06 
 (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.29) (0.29) 
GDP i,t-1 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.20 0.21 0.22 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.14) (0.15) (0.15) 
StockMarketCap i,t-1 c 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.24* 0.22† 0.22† 
 (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) 
Turnover i,t-1c -0.12 -0.12 -0.13 0.24* 0.25* 0.25* 
 (0.18) (0.18) (0.19) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) 
Expropriation i,t-1 1.47 0.29 0.30 0.04 1.24 1.25 
 (1.89) (1.71) (1.70) (1.30) (1.34) (1.35) 
Firm Fixed Effects   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes 
(continues) 
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(continued…) 
Dependent Variablea Citations Non self citations 
 (I) (II) (III) (I) (II) (III) 
ExperienceVCi,t-1b 0.64** 3.72*** 1.28 0.78** 3.82** 1.77 
 (0.23) (1.08) (1.51) (0.24) (1.24) (1.52) 
Experience VCi,t-1  
  * Expropriationi,t-1b  7.42** 6.97**  7.26* 6.88* 
  (2.50) (2.44)  (3.01) (2.97) 
Experience VCi,t-1  b 
  * Turnover i,t-1 b,c   0.45*   0.38* 
   (0.22)   (0.19) 
PatentStock i,t-1 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 0.04+ 0.04* 0.04* 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
PublicationStock i,t-1b 1.08 0.95 0.81 -1.70* -1.91** -2.01** 
 (0.74) (0.74) (0.69) (0.74) (0.73) (0.69) 
Firm’s Age i,t-1 1.14*** 1.14*** 1.20*** 1.05*** 1.06*** 1.11*** 
 (0.16) (0.15) (0.16) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) 
Firm’s Age squared i,t-1 -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.04*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Round of investment i,t-1 -0.33* -0.35* -0.40** -0.26 -0.28 -0.33+ 
 (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.17) (0.17) (0.18) 
VCi,t-1 0.26 0.25 0.29 0.22 0.21 0.24 
 (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) 
Financial Institution i,t-1 0.31 0.40+ 0.43* 0.03 0.13 0.15 
 (0.22) (0.21) (0.21) (0.29) (0.28) (0.28) 
CVC i,t-1 -0.70** -0.63* -0.56* -0.60 -0.55 -0.49 
 (0.27) (0.25) (0.24) (0.38) (0.37) (0.36) 
GDP i,t-1 -0.14 -0.16 -0.17 -0.25* -0.28* -0.28* 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11) 
StockMarketCap i,t-1 c 0.87** 0.84** 0.88** 1.03** 1.03** 1.05** 
 (0.29) (0.30) (0.30) (0.33) (0.33) (0.33) 
Turnover i,t-1c 0.25 0.23 0.14 0.16 0.13 0.05 
 (0.27) (0.27) (0.28) (0.28) (0.29) (0.30) 
Expropriation i,t-1 5.69* 1.49 1.59 4.77* 0.95 1.04 
 (2.30) (2.82) (2.72) (2.27) (3.20) (3.09) 
Firm Fixed Effects   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes 
a  Robust standard errors are in parentheses; n=1264 (venture-years), groups=288 (ventures) 
b  The Experience variables, Stock Market Capitalization and Turnover were divided by 100, 
and GDP by 1000. For interpretation, the coefficient should be divided by 100 (or 1000). 
   † p < 0.10,  * p < 0.05,  ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
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Discussion and Conclusion 
 This chapter sought to answer the question of where the innovative outcomes of 
firms are affected by their investors. While there is little doubt that investors pick winners 
and that their monetary contribution are critical to the research and development activities 
of firms, it is less clear whether they have an impact above and beyond that. Evidence at 
the industry level, however, seems to indicate they do (Kortum & Lerner, 2000). This 
chapter proposed that investors may increase the general efficiency of the firm, hence 
allowing more attention to be paid to the research activities, and that they provide firms 
with a better mapping of the industry and help them focus their research activities in 
areas with greater potential for commercialization. In fact, I find that more experienced 
investors increase both the patents and the publications of the firm, evidence which is 
consistent with these mechanisms even though they cannot be fully identified. 
 While investors may foster the innovative outcomes, they have a different impact 
depending on the uncertainty of the environment. I find that in situations with higher 
political and regulatory uncertainty investors have a higher impact on the research 
productivity of the firm. This observation is consistent with resource-dependence theory 
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978): as entrepreneurial firms face higher uncertainty, investors can 
make a higher contribution to the performance of the firm. Hence, this chapter speaks to 
the resource-dependence literature by linking it to the innovative processes, rather than 
just financial outcomes. In addition, I provide a broader context to understand the macro-
foundations of the strategy of firms, and how the firm’s strategy and its outcomes depend 
on the environments in which they operate. Even though investors may foster all types of 
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innovative outcomes, the impact varies for basic and applied science, and while the 
impact on patents depends on the regulatory environment, the impact on publications 
does not. This finding speaks to the stream of literature that has analyzed the differences 
across these two outcomes. 
 The main limitation of this chapter is that it cannot identify the processes by 
which investors foster the different innovative outcomes. Therefore, it remains an open 
question for future research to identify which mechanisms are driving the results. 
Another limitation of this research is that it is limited to the biotechnology industry. Even 
though the industry has attractive features for this study (i.e. measurable innovative 
output, global industry), it is a peculiar one. Therefore, the extent to which results are 
generalizable to other industries is a concern. 
 The findings of this chapter have implications for practice. Previous literature has 
suggested that firms should pay attention to who their investors are because their 
reputation and resources may impact firm performance. This chapter complements this 
finding by suggesting that investors may also impact the innovative processes of the firm, 
and so this may have a longer term impact on firm performance. The implication for 
investors is that their expertise may help foster the innovation of the firm, but the value of 
the experience depends also of the macro-conditions of the firm. And in particular, 
different types of experience may be more or less valuable depending on these 
conditions. 
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4. Investors’ Know-How or Investors’ “Know-Whom”? 
Introduction 
Thus far this dissertation has studied where experienced investors contribute to 
the performance and innovative outcomes of firms, setting aside the question of what 
drives this effect. Past research has shown evidence of a reputation endorsement by 
investors (Hochberg et al., 2007; Megginson & Weiss, 1991; Stuart et al., 1999). In 
addition, investors take advantage of their managerial capabilities and knowledge of the 
industry to act as consultants to their portfolio firms (Amit et al., 1998; Gorman & 
Sahlman, 1989). This chapter asks the question of where these two mechanisms, social 
capital and experience, are more important for the performance of the firms.  
Decades of research by interorganizational network theorists have demonstrated 
that the network of relationships of a firm and the relational assets that are derived from 
such network have an impact on firm’s performance (e.g. Burt, 1992; Nahapiet & 
Ghoshal, 1998). In addition, strategy scholars on the relational view of the firm have 
argued that firms may obtain relational rents from their network of contacts by combining 
the resources that each of them owns (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Lavie, 2006). As firms gain 
experience, they build their networks of contacts and as a result, acquire social capital. 
Hence, reputation endorsement I is one of the mechanisms by which experience impacts 
performance. 
There is evidence that firms benefit from the social capital of their close 
relationships, and in particular, they benefit from the social capital of their investors. 
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Stuart et al (1999) found that startups with more prominent partners survive longer and 
are more likely to go public. The rationale is that prominent investors reduce the problem 
of information asymmetries that third parties confront. In fact, third parties lack 
information about the quality and trustworthiness of the startup; when this startup is 
endorsed by a reputable partner, then the risk of the startup is reduced (Amit et al., 1998). 
This is what the finance literature has called the “certification effect” of investors 
(Megginson & Weiss, 1991). Sociologists name this problem the altercentric uncertainty, 
or the uncertainty about the quality and reputation that third parties have, in contrast to 
the egocentric uncertainty, which is the uncertainty that the focal firm has about its own 
position.  
Nevertheless, social capital is a complex construct. Network theorists have argued 
that there are two different sets of relationships that enhance the social capital of a firm. 
Firms whose position in the network is very central and dense benefit from prominence 
and reputation, while firms whose position connects firms otherwise unconnected benefit 
from richer access to information (Burt, 1992). Podolny (2001) argued that while a 
central position that signals quality is better suited to deal with altercentric uncertainty, a 
position in a structural hole that allows the firm to benefit from richer information is 
better suited to deal with egocentric uncertainty. Hence, while central positions act as 
prisms, structural holes are the pipes of the network. In this chapter I build on this 
distinction and analyze how different network positions may have different effects on the 
performance of firms depending on the type of uncertainty. 
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Hence, a brokerage position that provides ties to a more diverse set of actors 
reduces uncertainty by providing richer information and increasing familiarity, while 
status reduces uncertainty by signaling quality. As a result, the value of these positions is 
not constant across different environments and times. Jensen (2003) found that both the 
presence of market ties and the status of firms conferred and advantage to enter a new 
market; however, the value of status decreases over time and is less important to 
experienced customers. Guler and Guillen (2010a) found that the social status of firms is 
more easily transferred across countries; the brokerage advantage, however, derives from 
a richer information and connections and cannot be so easily transferred to a different 
country. This chapter seeks to extend this argument by analyzing how these two 
advantages vary across institutional environments. 
Finally, social capital, as the “network and the assets that may be mobilized 
through that network” (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998:1998), comprises a set of resources of 
investors that explain their impact on performance. However, past research has shown 
that there are other investors’ resources that may provide the firm with an advantage 
(Hochberg et al., 2007). For instance, their knowhow about how to conduct interviews, 
their managerial capabilities and knowledge of best practices may help them 
professionalize the firms (Hellmann & Puri, 2002); their knowledge of the market, helps 
them time the public offerings better (Lerner, 1994b). This chapter will compare the 
effects of network structure and the remaining effect of experience across different 
institutional environments. 
 
86 
 To measure the network of investors I build on previous literature (Lerner, 1994a; 
Sorenson & Stuart, 2001; Stuart et al., 1999) and focus on the co-investment (i.e. 
syndication) relationships among investors. These are by no means the only relevant 
connections that an investor brings to the venture, since contacts to other portfolio firms 
(Lindsey, 2002) or contacts with strategic partners may prove very useful. Yet, they are a 
homogeneous set of relationships that is very relevant especially for helping the venture 
advance through the different milestones towards an IPO or an acquisition. 
Hypotheses Development 
Investor Experience, Pipes, and Prisms  
Past research has described two main mechanisms by which investors contribute 
to the performance of their portfolio firms: reputation endorsements and value added. The 
literature has argued that investors such as venture capital firms reduce the information 
asymmetries that third parties face regarding new ventures; this is the certification or 
reputation endorsement phenomenon (Amit et al., 1998; Megginson & Weiss, 1991; 
Stuart et al., 1999). Scholars have also analyzed mechanisms that entail adding value to 
the firm; for instance, venture capital firms professionalize the top management teams 
and human resource policies (Hellmann & Puri, 2002), foster the formation of alliances 
of their portfolio firms (Hsu, 2006), or provide strategic advice (Gorman & Sahlman, 
1989). In essence, while the former depends more on the network of contacts of investors 
(know-whom), the latter is rooted on the knowledge resources and capabilities of the firm 
(knowhow). 
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These two mechanisms are closely intertwined, partly because having experience 
is an antecedent both to accumulating knowledge and to building relationships. Besides, 
intangible resources and the network of contacts are intertwined, and at times it may be 
difficult to ascribe a particular mechanism to one or the other category. Take for instance 
the professionalization of a top management team by attracting key talent to the firm. The 
capability to identify a talented manager and the knowhow of what abilities are required 
in a certain position are certainly knowledge-based. However, a firm with more 
connections will have a greater pool of managers to consider, and will be able to attract 
their talent, both of which are network-based. Therefore, it may not be possible to 
completely disentangle both mechanisms empirically. Despite the challenge in the 
interpretation, there is value in distinguishing these two mechanisms because they shed 
light on the processes behind the impact of investors on firm performance.  
 Therefore, the effect of investors’ experience is partly driven by the reputation 
endorsement mechanism, but not entirely. Hence, I expect this effect to persist even after 
controlling for the two network mechanisms. Hence: 
Hypothesis 4-1: Investors’ past IPO experience increases the chances of the 
venture going public or being acquired, even after controlling for the network of 
relationships. 
Entrepreneurial firms are faced with different sources of uncertainty, including 
whether the technology will succeed, the quality of the product, and how the market will 
receive it. In addition to this egocentric uncertainty, they lack a reputation for quality or 
trustworthiness. This increases the so called altercentric uncertainty or, in other words, 
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creates information asymmetries to third parties; and in return, generates more 
uncertainty regarding the success of the entrepreneurial ventures. The resources that a 
firm obtains from its network of relationships may help attenuate these sources of 
uncertainty. 
The status of investors acts as a prism attenuating the altercentric uncertainty. The 
reputation endorsement literature argues that investors with higher social capital, or 
reputation, enhance the performance of their portfolio firms. Stuart et al (1999) show that 
third parties rely on the prominence of the affiliates of entrepreneurial firms, such as 
investors, and that this allows them to perform better than firms which lack prominent 
associates. This certification or reduction in the information asymmetries is also proposed 
by Megginson and Weiss (1991) as one of the reasons why venture-capital-backed firms 
perform better. In their study of U.S. venture capital investments, Hochberg et al (2007) 
demonstrate that venture capital firms with higher status perform better on average, and 
that entrepreneurs backed with reputed venture capital firms survive longer. Therefore, I 
predict the baseline effect of the reputation of the investors on the hazard of an IPO or an 
acquisition to be positive. Since past research has found that the reputation of the 
investors is in general transferable across borders (Guler & Guillen, 2010a), I measure 
the reputation in the global network. 
Hypothesis 4-2: Investors’ global reputation increases the chances of the venture 
going public or being acquired. 
Investors’ network ties, as the pipes that channel information and resources, may 
position investors and their portfolio firms at an advantage. As a result of technological 
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and market uncertainty, entrepreneurial firms face uncertainty of whether they will 
succeed, that is, egocentric uncertainty. Investors with ties that can provide access to 
different expertise and resources may alleviate this uncertainty. For instance, an investor 
that has ties to investors in a foreign country may be in a better position to attract these 
foreign investors, or may have more contacts to find a potential acquirer in a different 
country, or even have the resources necessary to attempt a foreign public offering. Richer 
network ties may also provide advantageous to foster commercial alliances for the 
entrepreneurial firm. 
In the case of investors, this brokerage advantage may be very specific to a region 
or a country. Guler and Guillen (2010a) show that the brokerage advantage is not 
transferrable to other countries and, as a result, investors with a high brokerage advantage 
in their home country tend to stay. Another implication of this finding is that investors 
with a brokerage position in a country where they are investing may achieve advantage. 
Hence, I expect this brokerage advantage to have a positive effect on the performance of 
the entrepreneurial firm.19
 Hypothesis 4-3: Investors’ brokerage position in the venture’s country increases 
the chances of the venture going public or being acquired. 
  
Heterogeneity across environments? 
For entrepreneurs it may be desirable to partner with investors that have the 
experience, knowledge resources and networks that may provide the entrepreneur with an 
                                                 
19 Unfortunately, the empirical setting of this chapter allows me to test only the brokerage position in the 
global network, and as such, the measure may not address correctly the difficulty to transfer the brokerage 
advantage. In future versions the network boundaries shall be defined country by country to address this 
issue. 
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advantage. But because it is also costly to attract investors that are experienced and 
reputed (Hsu, 2004), it is relevant to understand under what conditions the experience 
and networks of the investors confer a greater advantage to the entrepreneur. Chapters 2 
and 3 of this dissertation studied how the impact of investor experience varies across 
different financial and regulatory environments. In this section I will focus on how the 
network connections of investors may impact firm performance differently depending on 
the external environment of the venture. 
In particular, the positive effects of reputation endorsements may be lower in 
environments with higher expropriation hazards. Previous literature has argued that when 
reputed investors invest in an entrepreneurial venture, they reduce the information 
asymmetries to third parties; this is the reputation endorsement or certification effect 
(Megginson & Weiss, 1991; Stuart et al., 1999). This reduction in uncertainty is less 
valuable when there are other sources of uncertainty that are more complex to resolve. 
Previous research has shown that political and regulatory hazards is one source of 
uncertainty for the investors that generally reduces the value of intangible resources, 
unless the investor has specific knowledge and connection to overcome it (Delios & 
Henisz, 2003). In an environment with a higher risk of political or regulatory 
expropriation, the endorsement of an investor with high social status may be less 
effective than in more stable environments, because this alone is generally not sufficient 
to thrive in that environment. Hence, I expect the effect to be attenuated in these cases.  
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Hypothesis 4-4: The effect of investors’ global reputation on the chances of the 
venture going public or being acquired decreases as the hazard of expropriation 
increases. 
Are Pipes and Prisms so relevant for Innovative Outcomes? 
As discussed in chapter 3, experienced investors may enhance the innovative 
outcomes of entrepreneurial firms by increasing the general efficiency of the firm, and 
hence allowing the managers to devote more attention to the innovative processes, and 
also by aiding the firm in focusing its technological trajectories. As a closing question for 
this dissertation, one could ask whether the social status or the brokerage of the investor 
may also improve the innovative processes of a firm, above and beyond the effect of 
experience. However, it probably doesn’t, especially because it is being considered is the 
network relationships with other investors. A different question for future research would 
be whether the relationships of the investor to other innovative entities, such as portfolio 
firms, or strategic investors, could have an effect on the rate of innovation within the 
focal firm. Since the investor could take advantage of this network to foster research and 
commercialization alliances, it would be more plausible to observe an effect. 
Nonetheless, regarding the co-investment network analyzed in this dissertation, I cannot 
hypothesize any effects of the network variables.  
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Methodology 
The Syndication Network 
 This chapter extends the previous two chapters by introducing the measures of the 
network position of the investors. I define the network of co-investment decisions (i.e. 
syndication) among venture capital firms, hence excluding other investors such as 
corporate venture capital firms, financial institutions, or government-sponsored firms 
from the network. By focusing on a single type of investor (or node) the co-investment 
relationship (or tie) is more homogeneous in the type of information or resources 
exchanged. Previous literature has found that syndication decisions among venture 
capital firms add value to the portfolio firm (Brander et al., 2002), or that provide 
information and contacts to the venture capital firms in the exchange that facilitate their 
geographical expansion (Sorenson & Stuart, 2001). 
 In order to build the network, I gathered all the investment information from 
VentureXpert (Thompson Financial) between 1967 and 2005, for investments in any 
industry and located in any country (~250,000 investments). With the help of several 
research assistants, I cleaned the database to match investment and investor information, 
and identified the venture capital firms in the network. Those venture capital firms with 
subsidiaries were considered as one sole investor. Following previous literature on 
dynamic networks, I defined an investment relationship (or tie) between two firms if they 
had co-invested in the same round of investment in the past 3 years (Guler & Guillen, 
2010a). Overall, there are 116,453 investments between 1987 and 2004. I constructed two 
different dynamic networks. The first one includes all the investments regardless of the 
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industry, and the second includes only those investments in a biotechnology firm. Table 
2-1 shows the number of venture capital firms in each of the two networks across time. 
Table 4-1. Syndication Networks, Nodes and Ties. 
 All investments Biotech investments 
 # nodes # ties # nodes # ties 
1987-1989 494 3,182 174 198 
1988-1990 515 3,029 165 182 
1989-1991 515 2,727 146 176 
1990-1992 521 2,593 159 184 
1991-1993 510 2,601 166 213 
1992-1994 545 2,851 180 227 
1993-1995 648 3,383 179 246 
1994-1996 796 4,614 193 263 
1995-1997 970 5,790 237 312 
1996-1998 1,192 7,300 295 402 
1997-1999 1,538 9,370 332 430 
1998-2000 2,000 13,618 430 578 
1999-2001 2,125 14,480 492 688 
2000-2002 2,166 13,792 521 753 
2001-2003 1,986 10,723 519 718 
2002-2004 1,878 9,693 529 709 
# Nodes: venture capital firms with investments. 
# Ties: rounds of investment with at least one 
venture capital firm. 
  
 Following the established literature, I measured social status using Bonacich’s 
(1987) eigenvector centrality measure. This measure is preferred in the literature to other 
centrality scores because it takes into account how central are the actors the focal actor 
connects to (Jensen, 2003; Podolny, 1993, 1994). The formula for the centrality of 
investor i in time t is as follows: ci,t=αt �Aij,tcj,tj  
where 𝛼𝑡 is the reciprocal of an eigenvalue, A is the adjacency matrix in time t, with Aij 
indicates when investors i and j have a tie at time t, and cjt is the centrality of investor j. 
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This measure is zero for a firm with no ties to any other firm, and it increases with the 
centrality of the focal firm. I computed this measure both for the network of all 
investments and the network of biotech investments; throughout the paper I present the 
results of the measure for the network of all investments, since social status tends to be 
more transferable (Guler & Guillen, 2010a). The results were robust to using just biotech. 
 The brokerage advantage is measured using Burt’s (1992) reverse-signed index of 
constraint, which in this context measures the extent to which a focal investor syndicates 
with investors who syndicate as well with partners of the focal investor. The formula is as 
follows: 
𝐵𝑖𝑡 =  −��𝑝𝑖𝑗�𝑝𝑖𝑞𝑝𝑞𝑗
𝑞
�
2
𝑗
 
where 𝑝𝑖𝑗 is the proportion if i’s network that relate to j, 𝑝𝑖𝑞 is the proportion of i’s 
network that relates to q, and 𝑝𝑞𝑗the proportion of q’s network that relates to j, with i ≠ j 
≠ q. Hence, the measure varies from -1, for nodes that are completely constrained, to 0 
for nodes that are no constrained; I assigned a value of 0 to those nodes that were 
isolated, following previous literature (Guler & Guillen, 2010a). Because the brokerage 
advantage refers to the possibility of controlling the information, or the contacts, it may 
be more relevant to calculate it for the network of biotech investments. Both network 
measures were computed using UCINET (Borgatti, Everett, & Freeman, 1999). 
Network and Experience Measures 
I match the venture capital firms in my sample with the investors in the 
syndication network to calculate the measures used in the analyses. For each 
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biotechnology firm and each year, I calculate the average of the centrality and the 
brokerage of the investors that are part of the syndicate at that time. These are the 
InvestorCentralityit and InvestorBrokerageit measures used in the analyses. 
Like in the two previous chapters, the experience of venture capital firms is 
measured as the total number of IPOs that venture capital firms have been involved in 
since founding up to that year. Besides this Experienceit variable, or here on 
Experience(IPOs)it, I calculate the Experience(Deals)it variable, which replicates the 
former but considers the total number of investments instead of only those that had an 
IPO. Using both variables allows me to compare the results in this chapter to those of 
previous literature.  
Results 
 Table 4-2 shows the descriptive statistics for the analysis of the investors’ 
network position on the hazard of an IPO or an acquisition. Note that since relationships 
are costly, the networks of investors do not tend to be dense; the average centrality of the 
investors included in my sample is 0.02, being 0 an investor that has never syndicated its 
investments, and 1 an investor that syndicates all its investments with investors that are 
also very active in syndication. While this number may seem low, it is similar to other 
studies (Guler & Guillen, 2010a; Hochberg et al., 2007). Regarding the brokerage 
position, on average investors scored -0.14 on the reverse signed constraint index, with a 
maximum of 0 for those investors that have all redundant ties to other investors, and a 
minimum of -1.13, for those investors that have a less constrained position that allows 
them to broker information. 
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Table 4-2. Descriptive Statistics 
  mean s.d. min max 
1. Experience(IPOs)i,t-1 11.60 37.23 0 366 
2. Experience(Deals) i,t-1 175.00 466.98 0 4,129 
3. InvestorCentrality i,t-1 0.02 0.12 0 1 
4. InvestorBrokerage i,t-1 -0.14 0.26 -1.13 0 
5. Experience(IPOs) i,t-1 *Expropriation i,t-1 6.60 21.80 0 219 
6. InvestorCentralityi,t-1 *Expropriation i,t-1 0.01 0.07 0 0.67 
7. Round i,t-1 0.99 1.12 0 10 
8. VC i,t-1 0.47 0.50 0 1 
9. SizeOfSyndicate i,t-1 1.61 2.34 0 20 
10. FinancialInstitution i,t-1 0.21 0.40 0 1 
11. CVC i,t-1 0.03 0.17 0 1 
12. VC Age i,t-1 5.94 11.09 0 129 
13. Expropriation i,t-1 0.54 0.08 0.29 1 
14. Turnover i,t-1 1.11 0.69 0.11 3.80 
15. GDP i,t-1 28.80 7.17 1.20 44.9 
16. StockMarketCap i,t-1 8.79 5.19 0.36 31.7 
17. Patents i,t-1 1.44 3.32 0 40 
18. Publications i,t-1 0.32 1.63 0 30.9 
19. BioPharma i 0.36 0.48 0 1 
20. YearOfFounding i 1997 3.07 1990 2003 
21. Spin-off i 0.23 0.42 0 1 
Data from all countries; not weighted (common statistical packages do not allow 
weights with longitudinal data); n = 3,359 venture-years. 
 
The Table 4-3 shows that there is no correlation between InvestorCentrality and 
InvestorBrokerage,20
                                                 
20 Note that InvestorCentrality was measured for the whole network and InvestorBrokerage only for the 
biotech network. The correlation is still zero when comparing the centrality and brokerage within the global 
network; the correlation is -0.05 and significant at 5% when considering the two measures within the 
biotechnology network. 
 and a very low correlation between these measures and the IPO 
experience of the venture capital firms (Experience(IPO)), hence increasing the 
confidence that these three measures are capturing different constructs. It is also worth 
noting that the correlation between InvestorCentrality and the experience as measured by 
the number of deals (Experience(Deals)) is 0.34. Overall these correlations may suggest 
that the successful experience, as measured by the number of IPOs, has a higher 
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discriminant validity respect to the centrality score than does the experience measured as 
the number of deals.  
From the correlations table is also apparent that there is clear multicollinearity 
between the main effects of Experience and Centrality and the interactions with the 
Expropriation Hazard measures. In robustness analyses I centered the variables, 
obtaining similar qualitative results as described below. 
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Table 4-3. Correlations 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Experience(IPOs)i,t-1           
2. Experience(Deals) i,t-1 .89          
3. InvestorCentrality i,t-1 .06 .34         
4. InvestorBrokerage i,t-1 -.05 -.09 -.02        
5. Experience(IPOs) i,t-1 
    *Expropriation i,t-1 .99 .88 .06 -.05       
6. InvestorCentrality i,t-1  
    *Expropriation i,t-1 .06 .33 .99 -.02 .06      
7. Round i,t-1 .52 .57 .14 -.31 .51 .14     
8. VC i,t-1 .33 .40 .22 -.56 .32 .22 .62    
9. SizeOfSyndicate i,t-1 .56 .66 .17 -.32 .54 .16 .76 .58   
10. FinancialInstitution i,t-1 .16 .22 .03 -.12 .14 .03 .40 .21 .55  
11. CVC i,t-1 .11 .14 .04 -.06 .09 .04 .18 .15 .29 .13 
12. VC Age i,t-1 .30 .48 .60 -.29 .30 .59 .41 .57 .40 .12 
13. Expropriation i,t-1 .10 .10 .08 -.02 .14 .09 .11 .05 .03 -.04 
14. Turnover i,t-1 .03 .02 -.03 -.11 .03 -.03 .12 .09 .04 .00 
15. GDP i,t-1 .19 .18 .05 -.05 .19 .05 .23 .20 .19 .07 
16. StockMarketCap i,t-1 .14 .09 .02 .05 .15 .02 .10 .04 .06 -.02 
17. Patents i,t-1 .28 .30 .05 -.08 .27 .06 .37 .22 .36 .17 
18. Publications i,t-1 .11 .16 .13 -.18 .11 .14 .15 .15 .15 .07 
19. BioPharma i .09 .11 .01 -.05 .09 .00 .13 .13 .15 .10 
20. YearOfFounding i -.07 -.06 -.03 -.05 -.07 -.03 -.05 .02 -.02 .06 
21. Spin-off i .07 .06 .03 .03 .06 .05 .05 .04 .07 .05 
  11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
11. CVC i,t-1           
12. VC Age i,t-1 .07          
13. Expropriation i,t-1 -.06 .11         
14. Turnover i,t-1 -.03 .02 .27        
15. GDP i,t-1 .07 .14 .01 -.16       
16. StockMarketCap i,t-1 .10 .06 .13 -.20 .37      
17. Patents i,t-1 .11 .15 .03 -.04 .15 .13     
18. Publications i,t-1 .02 .21 .05 -.04 .00 .01 .18    
19. BioPharma i .04 .06 .03 -.08 .16 .05 .07 .04   
20. YearOfFounding i -.01 -.02 -.06 .14 .11 .04 -.20 -.07 .09  
21. Spin-off i .08 .08 .09 -.11 .10 .21 .13 .09 .14 .06 
Data from all countries; not weighted (common statistical packages do not allow weights with 
longitudinal data); all correlations larger than 0.03 are significant at p < 0.05; n = 3,359 
venture-years. 
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 Following the same methodology as in chapter 2, I estimate the probability of a 
matching between a venture and a syndicate using a probit model. I included the same 
measures and the same instrument, i.e. Country Pairs Fixed Effects (see chapter 2 for 
details on the identification strategy), and added the measures of the network position of 
the investor (InvestorCentrality and InvestorBrokerage). In addition, I included the 
interaction between InvestorCentrality and Expropriation to account for the possibility 
that investors with a higher social status may be choosing to invest in countries with a 
lower Expropriation Hazard.  
 The results, reported in Table 4-4, show that having investors that are more 
central in the network and those with a greater brokerage position increase the chances of 
a matching. This may indicate that those investors with social capital are able to attract 
more capital and venture capital firms in successive rounds. However, investors that are 
more central prefer firms in environments with less Expropriation Hazard. This suggests 
that they have fewer incentives to utilize this social capital when they may lose more. It is 
also worth noting that the network position of the venture capital firms explains most of 
the variation from the presence of a VC, and some of the coefficients change. 
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Table 4-4. Results of the Probit Analysis on the Probability of Matching 
 (Selection)a  
Matching   
VCi,t -0.39*** (0.05) 
VCi,t*VCi,t-1 0.41*** (0.10) 
VCi,t*Experience(IPOs)i,t-1 b 0.00 (0.00) 
Syndicate controls   
Experience(IPOs)i,t-1 b -0.01 (0.01) 
VCi,t-1 0.12 (0.11) 
InvestorCentrality i,t-1 6.06*** (1.59) 
InvestorBrokerage i,t-1 0.19* (0.08) 
InvestorCentrality i,t-1   
        *Expropriation i,t-1 -9.31*** (2.69) 
Round1i,t-1 -0.35*** (0.05) 
SizeOfSyndicatei,t-1 0.20*** (0.02) 
FinancialInstitutioni, t-1 -0.00 (0.05) 
CVC i,t-1 0.24 (0.17) 
VC Age i,t-1 0.01* (0.00) 
Venture’s country controls   
Expropriationi,t-1 0.67 (0.42) 
Turnover i,t-1 0.16*** (0.04) 
GDP i,t-1 -0.03*** (0.01) 
StockMarketCapi,t-1 b -0.02* (0.01) 
Venture’s controls   
Patentsi,t-1 0.01 (0.01) 
Publicationsi,t-1 b -0.00 (0.01) 
BioPharmai -0.02 (0.05) 
YearOfFoundingi -0.02* (0.01) 
Spin-offi -0.12† (0.07) 
Constant 43.70 (17.69) 
Country Pairs Fixed Effects   Yes  
Year fixed effects   Yes  
a  Robust standard errors are in parentheses; n = 185,751 (all 
possible matches between active syndicates and ventures). 
b Experience, Publications, and StockMarketCap are linearly 
transformed (divided by 10); for interpretation, divide the 
coefficient by 10. 
    † p < 0.10 
    * p < 0.05 
  ** p < 0.01 
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Table 4-5 shows the results of the Cox regression model on the hazard of 
occurrence of an IPO or an acquisition. The baseline model (model 1) includes the 
controls and the Experience(IPOs) model, replicating the results found in chapter 2, while 
adding VC age as an additional control and including the Inverse Mill’s Ratio from the 
first stage which, in contrast to chapter 2, controls for the network position of the 
investor. The results are robust to these changes, though the coefficient for 
Experience(IPO) loses some statistical significance. 
 The next three models incorporate the InvestorCentrality measure (model 2), the 
InvestorBrokerage measure (model 3), and both measures simultaneously (model 4). 
Overall, none of the two measures are statistically different from zero; however, the 
Experience(IPOs) measure is robust to including these measures and significant at a 5% 
confidence level. Altogether, these results suggest that a greater experience of the venture 
capital firms increases the chances of the venture going public or being acquired, even 
after controlling for the social capital of the investors. Therefore, these results support the 
hypothesis 4-1, which stated that the effect of investor experience is not solely driven by 
the reputation of the investor, but there is also a know-how effect. However, these results 
do not support hypotheses 4-2 and 4-3, which predicted that investors with a more central 
position and with a greater brokerage position would increase the hazard of a liquidity 
event.  
 Guler and Guillen (2010a) show that while the social status conferred by being 
central in the network of investments is transferable across borders, this is not the case 
with the brokerage position, which is more country specific. Since the measure for 
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brokerage used here is calculated within the global network, I could not capture the 
nuances of which group of investors a particular venture capital is connected to; this may 
explain the lack of significance of this variable. A richer measure that accounts for the 
geography of the network may be needed to find effects. 
Overall, these results contrast with the findings of Hochberg et al (2007), who 
find that InvestorCentrality has a positive and significant effect on firm performance, 
while Experience has a positive but more moderate effect on firm performance. One of 
the reasons why these results differ may lie in the prediction that the effect of Experience 
and InvestorCentrality are not homogeneous across different regulatory environments. 
Model 5 tests the interaction of both measures with the Expropriation hazards measure, 
finding that while the main effect of Experience and InvestorCentrality on the hazard of a 
liquidity event is positive and significant, this effect is attenuated when the hazard of 
Expropriation is very high, in support of hypotheses 4-4. Hence, since the United States 
has a low Expropriation hazard, this may explain the magnitude and significance of the 
investor centrality measures in Hochberg et al (2007). These results are robust when only 
IPOs are considered (model 6), although some coefficients lose significance, partly due to 
a lower power of the analysis (i.e. less percentage of events).21
                                                 
21 In unreported regressions I analyzed the full model, including the interactions of the Experience variable 
with the Round of Investment and also with the stock market Turnover from the second chapter in the 
dissertation. When controlling for these interactions, many of the results lose significance, which may be a 
result of the high multicollinearity among them. 
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Table 4-5. Results of Cox Regression on the Hazard of an IPO or an Acquisition 
Dependent Variablea IPO or 
M&A 
 IPO or 
M&A 
 IPO or 
M&A 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  
Hypotheses       
(H4-1) Experience(IPOs)i,t-1 b 0.03† (0.02) 0.04* (0.02) 0.03† (0.02) 
(H4-2) InvestorCentrality i,t-1   0.51 (0.77)   
(H4-3) InvestorBrokerage i,t-1     -0.00 (0.38) 
(H4-4) InvestorCentrality i,t-1   
           *Expropriation i,t-1       
Experience(IPOs)i,t-1    
  *Expropriation i,t-1       
Syndicate Controls       
VCi,t-1 0.55* (0.26) 0.57* (0.26) 0.55† (0.28) 
Roundi,t-1 0.02 (0.10) 0.03 (0.10) 0.02 (0.10) 
SizeOfSyndicatei,t-1 0.01 (0.05) 0.01 (0.05) 0.01 (0.05) 
FinancialInstitutioni, t-1 0.42† (0.23) 0.42† (0.23) 0.42† (0.23) 
CVC i,t-1 0.36 (0.32) 0.35 (0.32) 0.36 (0.32) 
VC Age i,t-1 0.01 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 
Country Controls       
Expropriationi,t-1 -0.04 (1.64) -0.07 (1.64) -0.04 (1.65) 
Turnover i,t-1 0.09 (0.23) 0.09 (0.23) 0.09 (0.23) 
GDP i,t-1 -0.01 (0.02) -0.01 (0.02) -0.01 (0.02) 
StockMarketCapi,t-1b 0.03† (0.02) 0.03 (0.02) 0.03† (0.02) 
Venture Controls       
Patentsi,t-1 0.04** (0.02) 0.04** (0.02) 0.04** (0.02) 
Publicationsi,t-1b 0.00 (0.04) -0.00 (0.04) 0.00 (0.04) 
BioPharmai 0.50** (0.18) 0.50** (0.18) 0.50** (0.18) 
YearOfFoundingi 0.13** (0.04) 0.13** (0.04) 0.13** (0.04) 
Spin-offi 0.11 (0.22) 0.12 (0.22) 0.11 (0.22) 
Inverse Mill’s Ratioi,tc 1.21** (0.44) 1.21** (0.44) 1.21** (0.44) 
Country Fixed Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  
(continues…) 
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(…continued) 
Dependent Variablea IPO or 
M&A 
 IPO or 
M&A 
 IPO  
 (4)  (5)  (6)  
Hypotheses       
(H4-1) Experience(IPOs)i,t-1 b 0.04* (0.02) 0.29** (0.11) 0.44** (0.15) 
(H4-2) InvestorCentrality i,t-1 0.53 (0.78) 10.79* (4.91) 11.05+ (6.46) 
(H4-3) InvestorBrokerage i,t-1 -0.05 (0.39) -0.18 (0.39) 0.19 (0.63) 
(H4-4) InvestorCentrality i,t-1   
           *Expropriation i,t-1   -17.50* (8.61) -17.43 (11.31) 
Experience(IPOs)i,t-1    
  *Expropriation i,t-1   -0.44* (0.19) -0.68** (0.26) 
Syndicate Controls       
VCi,t-1 0.56† (0.29) 0.53† (0.29) 0.22 (0.45) 
Roundi,t-1 0.03 (0.10) 0.05 (0.10) -0.08 (0.14) 
SizeOfSyndicatei,t-1 0.01 (0.05) -0.01 (0.05) 0.11+ (0.06) 
FinancialInstitutioni, t-1 0.42† (0.23) 0.36 (0.23) 0.49 (0.34) 
CVC i,t-1 0.36 (0.32) 0.27 (0.33) -0.81 (0.58) 
VC Age i,t-1 0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 0.01 (0.02) 
Country Controls       
Expropriationi,t-1 -0.09 (1.65) 1.87 (1.68) 1.51 (2.12) 
Turnover i,t-1 0.09 (0.23) 0.06 (0.22) 0.18 (0.27) 
GDP i,t-1 -0.01 (0.02) -0.01 (0.02) -0.04+ (0.02) 
StockMarketCapi,t-1b 0.03 (0.02) 0.03 (0.02) 0.02 (0.03) 
Venture Controls       
Patentsi,t-1 0.05** (0.02) 0.04** (0.02) 0.04+ (0.02) 
Publicationsi,t-1b -0.00 (0.04) 0.00 (0.04) 0.01 (0.06) 
BioPharmai 0.50** (0.18) 0.48** (0.18) 0.95*** (0.28) 
YearOfFoundingi 0.13** (0.04) 0.13** (0.04) -0.02 (0.06) 
Spin-offi 0.12 (0.22) 0.11 (0.22) 0.48 (0.32) 
Inverse Mill’s Ratioi,tc 1.21** (0.44) 1.20** (0.44) 1.16+ (0.62) 
Country Fixed Effects Yes    Yes   Yes  
a  Robust standard errors are in parentheses; n = 3,359; country fixed effects for United States, 
Germany, United Kingdom, France, and Rep. of Korea.  
b Experience, Publications, and StockMarketCap are linearly transformed (divided by 10); for 
interpretation, divide the coefficient by 10. 
c Inverse Mill’s Ratio calculated from the results of the selection equation (stage 1). 
    † p < 0.10 
    * p < 0.05 
  ** p < 0.01 
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Table 4-6 further compares the results to those of Hochberg et al (2007). Model 8 
replicates model 4 but in the subsample of ventures founded in the United States, finding 
that the InvestorCentrality is positive and significant, while the Experience(IPOs) is not. 
Finally, because their measure of Experience is based on a count of deals in which 
investors have participated, and not a count of IPOs, model 7 estimates the effect of 
Experience(Deals) instead of Experience(IPOs). Note that this measure has a much lower 
coefficient, and it is not significant. Robustness tests were conducted and the effect of 
Experience(Deals) was consistently not significantly different from zero. Interestingly, 
the correlation of this measure with the centrality of the investor is much higher, which 
may indicate there is less discriminant validity. In other words, the experience of the 
investors as measured by the number of deals may be a better proxy of the social status or 
the size or tenure of the investors than of the know-how and resources that have been 
accumulated. 
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Table 4-6. Results, Comparison to Hochberg et al (2007) 
Dependent Variablea IPO or 
M&A 
 IPO or 
M&A 
 IPO or 
M&A 
 
Sample Whole  Whole  U.S.  
 (4)  (7)  (8)  
Hypotheses       
(H4-1) Experience(IPOs)i,t-1 b 0.04* (0.02)   -0.02 (0.04) 
(H4-1) Experience(Deals) i,t-1 b   0.00 (0.00)   
(H4-2) InvestorCentrality i,t-1 0.51 (0.77) 0.18 (0.78) 14.99† (7.75) 
(H4-3) InvestorBrokerage i,t-1   -0.02 (0.39) 0.49 (1.34) 
Syndicate Controls       
VCi,t-1 0.57* (0.26) 0.57* (0.29) 1.59† (0.91) 
Round1i,t-1 0.03 (0.10) 0.03 (0.10) -0.45† (0.24) 
SizeOfSyndicatei,t-1 0.01 (0.05) 0.01 (0.05) 0.29* (0.14) 
FinancialInstitutioni, t-1 0.42† (0.23) 0.40† (0.23) 0.51 (0.58) 
CVC i,t-1 0.35 (0.32) 0.33 (0.32) 0.44 (0.74) 
VC Age i,t-1 0.00 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) -0.09 (0.07) 
Country Controls       
Expropriationi,t-1 -0.07 (1.64) -0.07 (1.65) -87.33 (109.57) 
Turnover i,t-1 0.09 (0.23) 0.07 (0.23) -0.02 (0.71) 
GDP i,t-1 -0.01 (0.02) -0.01 (0.02) -0.04 (0.24) 
StockMarketCapi,t-1b 0.03 (0.02) 0.03† (0.02) 0.02 (0.10) 
Venture Controls       
Patentsi,t-1 0.04** (0.02) 0.04** (0.02) 0.06 (0.06) 
Publicationsi,t-1b -0.00 (0.04) 0.00 (0.04) 0.17 (0.17) 
BioPharmai 0.50** (0.18) 0.48** (0.18) 0.24 (0.52) 
YearOfFoundingi 0.13** (0.04) 0.13** (0.04) 0.20 (0.14) 
Spin-offi 0.12 (0.22) 0.13 (0.22) 0.92 (0.66) 
Inverse Mill’s Ratioi,tc 1.21** (0.44) 1.17** (0.44) 1.79 (1.15) 
Country Fixed Effects    Yes     Yes     No  
N 3,359  3,359    372  
a  Robust standard errors are in parentheses; country fixed effects for United States, Germany, 
United Kingdom, France, and Rep. of Korea. 
b Experience, Publications, and StockMarketCap are linearly transformed (divided by 10); for 
interpretation, divide the coefficient by 10. 
c Inverse Mill’s Ratio calculated from the results of the selection equation (stage 1). 
    † p < 0.10 
    * p < 0.05 
  ** p < 0.01 
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These findings are economically significant, as represented in figures 4-1 and 4-2. 
An increase of one standard deviation in the Experience of the syndicate (i.e. 37 IPOs), 
leads to a 33% increase in the hazard of an IPO or acquisition if there is a low 
Expropriation Hazard (one standard deviation below the mean), and to an increase of 
only 6% if the Expropriation Hazard is high (one standard deviation above the mean). 
Note that the impact of Experience on the hazard of a liquidity event has reduced 
significantly from the levels in figure 2-2, now that InvestorCentrality is accounted for. 
Figure 4-1. Effect of Experience by Level of Expropriation Hazard 
 
This graph shows the marginal effect on the Hazard Rate of an increase in 
Experience at three levels of Expropriation Hazard: mean, and plus/minus one 
standard error, using model 5 in table 4-5. An increase of a standard deviation in the 
Experience of the syndicate (that is, 37 additional IPOs), increases the hazard of an 
IPO or an acquisition by: a) 33% if Expropriation is one standard deviation below the 
mean; b) 19% if Expropriation is at the mean; c) 6% if Expropriation is at the mean 
plus one standard deviation. 
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 The effect of InvestorCentrality depends even more of the levels of Expropriation. 
Figure 4-2 shows that for high levels of Expropriation Hazard (one standard deviation 
above the mean), the effect is flat and virtually zero. However, when the Expropriation 
Hazard is very low, an increase of one standard deviation in InvestorCentrality (that is, 
an increase of 0.12), increases the hazard of an IPO or an acquisition by 174%.  
Figure 4-2. Effect of Centrality by Level of Expropriation Hazard 
 
This graph shows the marginal effect on the Hazard Rate of an increase in 
InvestorCentrality at three levels of Expropriation Hazard: mean, and plus/minus one 
standard error, using model 5 in table 4-5. An increase of a standard deviation in the 
InvestorCentrality of the syndicate (that is, an increase of 0.12), increases the hazard 
of an IPO or an acquisition by: a) 174% if Expropriation is one standard deviation 
below the mean; b) 34% if Expropriation is at the mean; c) and reduces the hazard by 
1% if Expropriation is at the mean plus one standard deviation. 
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Finally, I test the effect of InvestorCentrality and InvestorBrokerage compared to 
the effect of investor Experience(IPOs) on the flow of innovative outcomes. Table 2-6 
presents the results of the same estimation procedure used in chapter 3, adding the two 
network position variables. Overall, Experience(IPOs) has an effect on the three 
outcomes even after controlling for the network measures, while the latter have generally 
no effect on the innovative outcomes. Even though the coefficient for InvestorCentrality 
is negative and significant on the flow of publications, robustness analyses (unreported) 
show that this effect is not consistent throughout models. The results were also robust to 
adding the interactions of Experience and Expropriation Hazard. Therefore, these results 
suggest that the social status and brokerage of the investors has an impact on the hazard 
of a liquidity event but not on the innovative outcomes of the firm, as expected. 
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Table 4-7. Results of QMLE Poisson on Innovative Outcomes 
Dependent Variablea Patentsit Publicationsit Patent Citationsit 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  
Main variables       
Experience(IPOs)i,t-1 b 0.04* (0.02) 0.04* (0.02) 0.06* (0.02) 
InvestorCentrality i,t-1 -0.63 (0.74) -0.76* (0.32) -0.51 (1.51) 
InvestorBrokerage i,t-1 -0.03 (0.29) 0.14 (0.26) 0.22 (0.32) 
Syndicate Controls       
VCi,t-1 0.13 (0.19) 0.05 (0.16) 0.02 (0.25) 
Round1i,t-1 -0.12 (0.12) -0.05 (0.10) -0.29* (0.13) 
FinancialInstitutioni, t-1 0.32† (0.18) 0.03 (0.13) 0.32 (0.24) 
CVC i,t-1 0.02 (0.32) -0.22 (0.28) -0.77** (0.24) 
VC Age i,t-1 0.00 (0.01) 0.01*** (0.00) 0.03† (0.02) 
Country Controls       
Expropriationi,t-1 0.92 (2.02) 0.25 (1.21) 5.53* (2.34) 
Turnover i,t-1 -0.11 (0.14) 0.37** (0.13) 0.18 (0.20) 
GDP i,t-1 0.04 (0.11) -0.06 (0.08) -0.29* (0.14) 
StockMarketCapi,t-1b 0.01 (0.02) 0.05*** (0.02) 0.08*** (0.02) 
Venture Controls       
Patent Stocki,t-1 -0.14*** (0.03) 0.01 (0.03) -0.02 (0.02) 
Publication Stocki,t-1b 0.00 (0.16) -0.22*** (0.04) 0.24 (0.17) 
Patent Stocki,t-1 
     * Publication Stocki,t-1b 0.01*** (0.00) -0.00 (0.00) -0.00 (0.00) 
Patent Citation Stocki,t-1 -0.01 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 
Agei,t 0.57*** (0.10) 0.75*** (0.10) 1.19*** (0.17) 
Agei,t2 -0.04*** (0.01) -0.04*** (0.01) -0.05*** (0.01) 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  
Venture-years 1,134  1,266  706  
Ventures 248  299  145  
a  Robust standard errors are in parentheses; regression estimated with the –xtqmlp- procedure in 
Stata.  
b Experience, Publications, and StockMarketCap are linearly transformed (divided by 10); for 
interpretation, divide the coefficient by 10. 
    † p < 0.10 
    * p < 0.05 
  ** p < 0.01 
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Discussion and Conclusions 
 Building on the previous two chapters, I analyzed the extent to which the effect of 
investor experience on entrepreneurial firms derives from adding value to the firm or 
from a certification effect. Using the same empirical setting and analyses, I study the 
effect of the social status of the investor and the remaining effect of investor experience 
as proxies for the two mechanisms, finding both effects. In particular, the effect of 
investor experience remains significant after controlling for the social status and 
brokerage of the investor, which indicates that the knowledge resources of the investors 
are relevant. The social status of the investors, however, facilitates the process of a firm 
going public or being acquired, but does not affect directly the innovative outcomes of 
the firm.  
Consistent with previous literature, when investors of high social status endorse a 
new venture, there is a reputation transfer that enhances the chances of this venture going 
public or being acquired. This reputation endorsement effect, however, does not affect 
directly the innovative outcomes of firms. Another implication of these findings is that 
investors experience has a direct effect on performance after controlling for the reputation 
effect; but also an indirect effect through its impact on the innovative processes.  
 The results of this paper further complement those of Hochberg et al (2007) by 
analyzing how both effects change across different institutional environments. Consistent 
with their findings, both the reputation of the investors and their knowhow enhance firm 
performance. However, I found that these effects change across institutional 
environments at different rates. Therefore, future research should examine these issues in 
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cross-national and longitudinal empirical settings to gain a better understanding of the 
dynamics of both processes. 
 One caveat of this study is that it seeks to separate the effects of social status and 
knowhow, while these effects are intrinsically related. In fact, they share a common 
antecedent: experience. As investors engage in investments, they build a network of 
contacts that provides them reputation, but they also learn from that experience, build 
capabilities, and acquire know-how. This intrinsic correlation among the two concepts is 
difficult to sort out empirically. I have followed past research and compared the effects of 
network position and the remaining effect of experience. However, it is necessary to 
exercise caution in the interpretation of the results. A firm that attracts a great manager 
takes advantage of its know-how to identify talent, a network of contacts to reach her, 
and a reputation to attract her.  
 In future research I seek to extend this study by comparing the position of the 
investors in the global network with the position in the individual country networks. The 
findings by Guler and Guillen (2010a) suggest that there is value in comparing the 
networks in different countries, since some of the characteristics of the network position 
cannot be transferred. Besides syndication networks, future research could also 
investigate the consequences of the network position of investors in different networks, 
such as the portfolio firms network or connections to other firms in the industry.  
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5. Conclusions 
This dissertation has sought to answer the questions of how and where investors 
add value to the entrepreneurial firms they invest in. I have shown that experienced 
investors may knowledge and networks of contacts that are valuable to firms, but this 
value is contingent on the external environment. Controlling for the matching of investors 
and firms, I found that experienced investors have an effect on the likelihood that a 
startup will go public or will be acquired, and also on the innovative outcomes of firms. 
While part of this effect is due to the network of contacts of the investors, there is an 
additional effect of experience which suggests the knowhow of the investor is also 
relevant. Jointly, these results suggest that the effect of investor experience on the 
performance of firms adds value beyond a transfer of reputation.  
However, this effect is contingent on the environment of the firm. This 
dissertation contributes to the past literature by analyzing how experienced investors add 
value to portfolio firms differently under different institutional environments. In 
particular, in uncertain environments entrepreneurial firms depend more on external 
resources, and experienced investors have a greater effect on firm performance. This 
finding is consistent with resource-dependence theory. For entrepreneurs it is difficult to 
access the resources investors offer, such as network of contacts or managerial 
capabilities; yet, these resources are very important for them, especially when there is 
more uncertainty in the environment. The finding that the effect of experience varies with 
the environment supports the thesis that the optimal strategy is not independent from the 
environment. A summary of the hypotheses can be found on table 5-1. 
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Table 5-1. Summary of Hypotheses 
Hypothesis  Support 
2-1 Investors’ past IPO experience increases the chances of the 
venture going public or being acquired. 
 Yes 
2-2 The effect of investors’ past IPO experience on the chances of 
the venture going public or being acquired is greater during 
the first round of investment than in subsequent rounds. 
 No 
2-3 The effect of investors’ past IPO experience on the chances of 
the venture going public or being acquired decreases as the 
liquidity of the local stock market increases. 
 Yes 
2-4 The effect of investors’ past IPO experience on the chances of 
the venture going public or being acquired decreases as the 
hazard of expropriation increases. 
 Yes 
3-1 The number of innovative outcomes of a firm increases with 
the experience of the venture capital firms in the investment 
syndicate.  
 Yes 
3-2 The effect of the experience of the venture capital firms on the 
innovative outcomes of a firm is greater when the firm faces 
increased political and regulatory hazard.  
 Yes 
4-1 Investors’ past IPO experience increases the chances of the 
venture going public or being acquired, even after controlling 
for the network of relationships. 
 Yes 
4-2 Investors’ global reputation increases the chances of the 
venture going public or being acquired. 
 No 
4-3 Investors’ brokerage position in the venture’s country 
increases the chances of the venture going public or being 
acquired. 
 No 
4-4 The effect of investors’ global reputation on the chances of the 
venture going public or being acquired decreases as the hazard 
of expropriation increases. 
 Yes 
 
Even though this dissertation has shown that the effect of investors on startups 
vary across institutional environments, it has also posed further questions regarding the 
processes. In particular, when comparing the results of the first two essays there is an 
apparent contradiction: experienced investors have more effect on the likelihood of a firm 
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going public or being acquired when the expropriation hazard is low, but more effect on 
innovative outcomes when the expropriation hazard is high. To reconcile these results 
one would need more information on what experience and expropriation hazard really 
represent. In general, firms perform worse if there is an expropriation hazard, unless they 
have the experiential learning to deal with the political risk in a country (Delios & 
Henisz, 2003). Hence, while an investor may be very experienced in past deals, we 
should ask whether this experience was suited to learn how to operate in a country with 
higher political risk. In other words, it is necessary to distinguish between experience in 
countries with high political risk and experience in countries with lower political risk. 
Likewise, one could argue that political risk has very different implications for the 
process of going public or being acquired, and for the innovative processes. For instance, 
the former is an event in a point in time in which it is critical to manage the stakeholders. 
The latter, however, extends during a long period of time; and may be more affected by 
big regulatory changes regarding intellectual property rights or, in the case of 
biotechnology firms, what areas of research are allowed. In these cases, a good 
understanding of the regulations and not necessarily managing the actors may suffice. In 
sum, to reconcile these results the nuances of these two variables should be explored. 
This dissertation contributes to resource-dependence theory by providing an 
empirical test of how the effect of external resources varies with the uncertainty in the 
environment. Resources of investors such as managerial capabilities, or human resources 
knowhow, or contacts, are common to many organizations and therefore they would not 
qualify as “controlled.” However, they can be defined as controlled from the perspective 
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of an entrepreneurial firm that has limited ways to access them. Hence, by considering a 
more firm-specific definition of what controlled resources are, it is possible to extend the 
empirical application of resource-dependence theory. Resource-dependence theorists may 
benefit from a more firm-specific definition of what is a controlled external resource, 
allowing the theory to be applied to a wider set of situations. This dissertation provides 
one example of this empirical testing.  
This dissertation also speaks to the relational view of the firm, which posits that 
relational rents can be generated if there are relation-specific assets, knowledge-sharing 
routines, complementary resources or capabilities, or effective governance (Dyer & 
Singh, 1998). Hence, while investors and entrepreneurial firms may benefit from their 
partnership this requires establishing knowledge-sharing routines, investing in specific 
assets, or setting an adequate governance (De Clercq & Sapienza, 2001). Since the 
benefits are not automatic, the experience of investors in alliances is critical to enhancing 
the performance of the firms they invest. When the environment of the entrepreneurial 
firm is more uncertain, there is a greater advantage in the relational rents that can be 
obtained from the partnership. The resource-dependence theory and the relational view of 
the firm are, hence, complementary. While the former explains the situations under which 
a firm may benefit from the environment, the latter explains how this potential value may 
be realized. 
Entrepreneurship scholars have sought to understand to what extent the investors 
association to firm performance is due to the matching of investors and firms and to what 
extent they add value to the firm. Research evidence seems to suggest that both effects 
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coexist (Baum & Silverman, 2004; Sørensen, 2007). My dissertation adds to this stream 
of literature by testing both effects in a cross-national framework, finding evidence of 
both effects using different methodologies and on different dependent variables, adding 
further support to the hypothesis that investors add value beyond the selection of 
investments. 
Another question in the entrepreneurship literature is whether this effect of 
investors on performance is a pure endorsement or signaling effect or whether there is 
some influence on the strategy and bundle of resources of entrepreneurial firms. That is, 
whether investors certify and/or add value. While past research has found that both 
effects coexist, most studies have considered them separately. One exception is Hochberg 
et al’s (2007) research, which using a sample of U.S. venture capital investments found 
evidence of both effects. This dissertation adds to this research stream by testing both 
effects in an international setting. My results confirm the finding by Hochberg et al 
(2007) and, in addition, show that both the effect of investor experience and investor 
network position are contingent on the characteristics of the institutional environment. As 
a consequence, further research should approach this question in a longitudinal and cross-
national setting to fully understand the dynamics of both effects.  
In addition, by studying the effect of investor experience and investor network 
position on two different outcomes, this dissertation sheds light on the processes by 
which investors add value to a firm. I found that while the contacts of investors enhance 
the chances that the firm will go public or will be acquired, it does not directly affect the 
innovative outcomes of the firm. However, the experience of investor has an effect on 
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both outcomes, and so it is plausible that fostering the innovation of a firm is one indirect 
mechanism by which investors’ knowhow impacts firm financial performance.  
Finally, this dissertation has sought to contribute to the international business 
literature by analyzing how these effects vary across different countries and institutional 
environments. Past research has shown that the strategies of venture capital firms change 
depending on the environment. The decision to enter a country depends both on the 
network position of the investor in their home country (Guler & Guillen, 2010a) and on 
the institutions in the country of destination (Guler & Guillen, 2010b). The strategy of 
investors may also differ across countries, because the risk of the ventures that are backed 
by venture capital firms is similar across countries, hence suggesting that investors are 
more careful in the selection of investments in countries where there is ex ante a higher 
risk (Guler & McGahan, 2006). My dissertation extends the growing international 
entrepreneurship literature by showing that the institutional environment moderates the 
extent to which investors and firms may generate relational rents in their partnership. In 
other words, there is not an optimal strategy for managing the partnership relationship. 
This dissertation is not without limitations. I have analyzed a single industry in 
order to control more the variation in the data. However, single industry studies pose 
more concerns to the generalizability of the results. One of the peculiarities of the biotech 
industry is that startups require more time to be profitable; therefore, this increases the 
information asymmetries of investors when selecting their investments. To the extent that 
the selection stage is controlled for, some of these concerns may be lessened. Besides, 
because biotechnology startups tend to be located in countries with a moderate to high 
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intellectual property protection, there is a restriction in range for some of the institutional 
variables. While this makes the tests more conservative, there is a concern about the 
generalizability of the results outside the observed range. Finally, while the data in this 
dissertation spans a large variety of firms and countries, it lacks the richness of smaller 
sample studies. Hence, there is less evidence about the actual processes by which the 
experience of investors impacts firm performance.  
The results of this dissertation pose questions for future research. In particular, the 
effect of investor experience should be further unpacked. Not all experience is the same, 
and it does not have the same value for different processes, as evidenced from the 
different directionality of the results on innovation and financial performance. One of the 
dimensions that should be considered is whether investors have specialized on early stage 
investments or in later stage investments. While the former may be more relevant to 
identify which products have a better commercialization potential and, hence, help the 
firm focus and foster its innovative outcomes, the latter may be more useful to facilitate 
the IPO or acquisition process. Whether the investor has experience in environments with 
a more turbulent political or regulatory environment may also be relevant to better 
understand the interplay of these two variables.  
Even though the theoretical predictions were tested in the setting of venture 
capital firms, I believe many of them could be extended to other investor types. In 
particular, investors that are generally involved in the management of the firm have the 
potential to enhance (or decrease) the performance of the firms they invest in. Future 
research could analyze the different goals and interests of investors to compare whether 
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the effects are similar or different to those of venture capital firms. Moreover, some of 
these hypotheses could be extended to investors in firms that are established. Stakeholder 
theorists have analyzed how institutional investors contribute to the performance of firms 
(David, Hitt, & Gimeno, 2001). An analysis of how their experience and connections 
may be external resources to organizations may improve our understanding of the 
phenomenon of investor activism.  
 The findings of this dissertation have implications for entrepreneurs as well as for 
investors. When evaluating financing options, entrepreneurs face a choice among 
investors with a variety of experience, investors that also offer different monetary 
contributions. While past research has shown that entrepreneurs are willing to forego 
valuation to attract more reputed investors to their firms (Hsu, 2004), entrepreneurs 
should understand when such reputation will translate into higher performance. In other 
words, depending on the uncertainty derived from the financial markets or regulatory 
institutions, the entrepreneur may be better off by attracting a reputed investor or not. 
Investors face a different dilemma. With limited attention, they have to decide how to 
allocate the time of their human resources to the firms in the portfolio (Gifford, 1997). 
Knowing when their expertise and network of contacts have a greater impact on 
performance may be useful in determining the optimal allocation of their resources.  
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